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Peter Winch of Wittgenstein’s comment that he could not help seeing every problem 
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Introduction 
 
 
In a famous remark by Ludwig Wittgenstein, the philosopher once said, “I am not 
a religious man, but I cannot help seeing every problem from a religious point of view.”  
It is statements such as this that have led to much debate about the relationship of religion 
to Wittgenstein and his philosophy. Unfortunately, the only sources we have of 
Wittgenstein’s comment on the matter are scattered statements in his personal writings, 
brief remarks reported by those who knew him, a set of student notes later titled 
“Lectures on Religious Belief,” and a set of remarks on an anthropological work about 
magico-religious ritual. Wittgenstein never wrote anything on the subject of religion that 
he intended for publication and never gave a comprehensive treatment of the subject in 
any form whatsoever.   
Despite this lack of formal treatment of the topic of religion, and the scant number 
of sources from which to decipher Wittgenstein’s views on the subject, a 
“Wittgensteinian” position within the philosophy of religion has arisen nevertheless.  
Moreover, this position has become one of the major contenders in contemporary 
philosophy of religion, representing an exciting new era in the subject after a period of 
relative neglect arising from influences of Logical Positivism.  From many sides, 
however, the “Wittgensteinian” position has come to be disparagingly referred to as 
2  
 
“Wittgensteinian Fideism,” with this label seeming to have originated in a 1967 article of 
the same title by Kai Nielsen.1   
This thesis will explore the relation of religion to Wittgenstein’s thought, as well 
as the application of Wittgenstein’s philosophy to the philosophy of religion.  
Consideration will be given to a number of interpreters and critics in order to provide an 
understanding of Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion and to examine whether the 
accusations of ‘Wittgensteinian Fideism’ and other criticisms have any merit.  
In the first chapter, I will outline the transition from Wittgenstein’s earlier to his 
later thought.  In the process, I will discuss the implications for religion in the earlier 
thought.  The rest of this thesis will be concerned with interpretations and criticisms of 
Wittgenstein’s later thought on religion.  In the second chapter, I will look first at 
interpretations offered by Norman Malcolm and Peter Winch, and then discuss Kai 
Neilsen’s classic critique of these Wittgensteinian philosophers of religion.  The third and 
final chapter will consider the application of Wittgenstein’s later thought to the 
philosophy of religion. It will examine arguments from D. Z. Phillips, perhaps the leading 
Wittgensteinian philosopher of religion, as well criticisms by Mark Addis and Gareth 
Moore. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1
 Kai Nielsen, “Wittgensteinian Fideism,” Philosophy, 42, (1967) 191-209.  
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Chapter 1 
 
I. Tractatus 
 Wittgenstein’s earlier thought, as embodied in the Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus2, had the primary goal of drawing out the philosophical implications of the 
new formal logic that had been developed by Gottlieb Frege and Bertrand Russell.  This 
new logic represented a powerful tool which overcame many limitations of classical 
Aristotelian logic.  In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein would not be interested in simply 
developing further technical aspects of this new logic, but in showing its application to 
the pressing issues of philosophy.  “[The Tractatus] marks the point at which the 
nineteenth-century debate about the nature of logic merges with the Post-Kantian debate 
about representation and the nature of philosophy.”3  As both of these debates were 
argued in terms of the laws of thought, the point of intersection between the two issues 
lies in the concept of thought.   
In keeping with Kant, Wittgenstein held, “Unlike science, [philosophy] does not 
itself represent reality, but reflects on the preconditions of representing reality.”4  
Accordingly, the task of philosophy is to determine the boundary between legitimate and 
illegitimate thought.  However Wittgenstein would introduce an important ‘twist’ to this 
Kantian project, a twist which is the origin of the ‘linguistic turn’ in philosophy.  
Wittgenstein held that thoughts are simply propositions which are projected onto reality.  
                                               
2
 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 1921. 
3
 Hans-Johann Glock, “The Development of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy,” in Wittgenstein: A Critical 
Reader, Ed. Hans-Johann Glock. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 2001. 6.  
4
 Ibid., 6. 
4  
 
“For this reason, thoughts can be completely expressed in language, and philosophy can 
establish the limits and preconditions of thought by establishing the limits and 
preconditions of the linguistic expression of thoughts.”5  Moreover, it is not just that the 
limits of thought may be drawn in terms of the limits of their linguistic expression, but 
that they must be so drawn.  As Wittgenstein points out in the Preface of the Tractatus, to 
attempt to draw the limits of thought in terms of thought itself, “we should have to find 
both sides of the limit thinkable (i.e. we should have to be able to think what cannot be 
thought).”6  We might say, then, that this project of delineating the limits of thought in 
terms of the limits of language is one which draws the limits of thought ‘from the inside.’   
As for what lies beyond these limits, “[it] is not unknowable things in themselves, 
as in Kant, but only nonsensical combinations of signs, such as ‘The concert-tone A is 
red.’”7  What makes this proposition nonsensical is that it violates the rules of ‘logical 
grammar’ or ‘logical syntax.’  These rules determine whether a set of signs has been 
combined meaningfully, and is thus able to represent reality.  This point brings us to the 
core of the Tractatus, the so-called ‘picture theory of meaning.’ 
According to the picture theory of meaning, language is a picture or model of 
states of affairs in the world.  There is an isomorphic relationship between language and 
the world.  “The essential logical form of language is identical with the essential 
metaphysical form of reality, because it comprises those structural features which 
                                               
5
 Ibid., 6. 
6
 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Trans. by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness. 
London: Routledge, 2001. 3. 
7
 Glock, 6. 
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language and reality must share if the former is to be capable of depicting the latter.”8  In 
other words, if our linguistic signs are to be capable of saying something about the world, 
then they must have the same basic structure as the reality which they are to say 
something about.    
This basic insight is filled out as follows: Words, or as Wittgenstein calls them 
‘names,’ stand for simple objects in the world.  These objects give the words their 
meaning.  It is important that these objects be simple.  If they were not simple then we 
would need to grasp the yet simpler elements which comprise these objects.  If language 
is to be able to say something about the world, an infinite regress must be avoided by 
coming to a set objects and words that are simple in an absolute sense.   
Words, or ‘names,’ combine to form propositions.  A meaningful proposition is 
one that depicts a possible ‘state of affairs.’  This term refers to a metaphysically possible 
combination of objects in the world.  The proposition then has a truth-value (is true or 
false) based upon whether or not this state of affairs (combination of objects) actually 
obtains in the world.  If a proposition does not conform to the constraints of metaphysical 
combinatorial possibility of objects in the world, then the proposition is nonsensical.  The 
previously mentioned proposition, ‘The concert-tone A is red,’ is an example of this sort 
of nonsensical combination.  While this proposition violates the rules of logical grammar, 
which dictate how words may be combined, it is simultaneously violating the 
metaphysical possibility of the ways in which objects in the world may be combined.  
                                               
8
 Ibid., 7. 
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Propositions such as this are incapable of having a truth-value (being true or false), as 
they are simply nonsense.   
Wittgenstein holds that the propositions of ordinary language must be analyzed if 
their logical structure is to be made apparent.  Propositions of ordinary language are 
called ‘complex propositions,’ and may be analyzed into the ‘elementary propositions’ 
that comprise them.  Elementary propositions are in turn made of the words or ‘names’ 
just mentioned.  It is important to note that a proposition does not itself name anything, 
but merely depicts a possible state of affairs.  It has what Wittgenstein calls a ‘sense,’ 
meaning that it shows a possible way in which words (and correspondingly objects in the 
world) may be combined.  The elementary proposition is then a ‘function’ of whether the 
state of affairs it describes exists, in other words, whether the objects it names are 
arranged as such.  Its truth-value is a result of this ‘function.’  Just as an elementary 
proposition is a function of the existence of the state of affairs it describes, a complex 
proposition is a function of the truth-values of the elementary propositions which 
comprise it.   
Each elementary proposition is logically independent of all other elementary 
propositions.  In other words, the truth or falsity of a given elementary proposition will 
have no ramifications on any other elementary proposition.  Each is solely a function of 
the existence of the state of affairs it describes.  This feature of the Tractatus is known as 
the doctrine of logical atomism, an idea which Wittgenstein inherited from Russell.  
While Wittgenstein was unable to provide an actual example of either an elementary 
7  
 
proposition or simple objects which words name, he argued that these aspects of language 
and the world must exist if the former is to be able to say something about the latter.     
The other central idea of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus has to do with what he says 
about logic.  While Frege held that logic describes relations between abstract entities and 
Russell that logic describes the most pervasive features of the universe, Wittgenstein 
would show that logical propositions do not describe anything and are actually vacuous 
tautologies.  “The logical constants (propositional connectives and quantifiers) are not 
names of logical objects or functions, as Frege and Russell had it, but express the truth-
functional operations through which complex propositions are constructed out of simple 
ones.”9  According to Wittgenstein, logical constants are merely the means by which we 
combine elementary propositions, in other words, rules for the combination of signs.  
There are no ‘logical objects’ in the world to which these signs correspond.  If there were, 
then there would be a difference in meaning between the propositions ‘It is raining’ and 
‘It is not the case that it is not raining.’  But we hold that ‘p’ and ‘not not p’ are logically 
equivalent.  Thus, logic does not name anything and tells us nothing about the world.  For 
example, that I know it is either raining or not raining tells me nothing about the weather.  
“The necessity of [logical propositions] reflects the fact that they combine bipolar 
propositions in such a way that all information cancels out.”10  The rules of logic are 
exclusionary; they show what cannot be the case.   
                                               
9
 Ibid., 8. 
10
 Ibid., 8. 
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One implication of Tractarian theory is that metaphysical propositions are held to 
be nonsensical pseudo-propositions.  According to the Tractatus, the task of a proposition 
is to picture a state of affairs, a possible combination of objects in the world.  Meaningful 
language is thereby restricted to empirical or scientific discourse.  As metaphysical 
propositions do not picture a state of affairs in the world, they thereby lack a sense, and 
hence, are nonsensical.  Like the propositions of logic, metaphysical propositions are 
exclusionary in that they tell us what could not be otherwise.  For example, they tell us a 
thing such as ‘red’ is a color and not a sound.  “What such pseudo-propositions try to say 
is shown by the structure of genuine propositions (e.g. that ‘red’ can combine only with 
names of points in the visual field, not with names of musical tones).”11  The necessity 
which metaphysical propositions attempt to state is instead shown by the rules we follow 
in combining words.  “The only necessary propositions which can be expressed are 
tautologies and hence analytic (their negation is a contradiction).” 12   
It follows from all of this, perhaps paradoxically, that the propositions of the 
Tractatus themselves are nonsensical.  Indeed Wittgenstein says at 6.54,  
My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually 
recognizes them as non-sensical, when he has used them—as steps—to climb up beyond them. (He 
must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.) 
He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright. 13 
 
The obvious question that arises is, if the propositions of the Tractatus are themselves 
nonsensical, then how can they be understood, let alone be elucidatory?  One answer 
                                               
11
 Ibid., 9. 
12
 Ibid., 9. 
13
 Tractatus, 89. 
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seems to lie in the notion that there are different types of nonsense.  Nonsense does not 
necessarily imply gibberish, as we often conceive of it.  The philosophical propositions of 
the Tractatus, like metaphysical propositions, attempt to say something that does not 
depict a possible state of affairs.  Therefore, these philosophical propositions also lack a 
sense.  This seems to be the sense in which these propositions are nonsensical, while they 
do give us a correct orientation about how to understand the world.  Once we have gained 
this orientation, we are to set these propositions aside as the nonsense that they are. 
 
II. Religion in the Tractatus 
 Now let us turn to a consideration of the place of religion in the Tractatus.  It may 
seem initially that the Tractatus is a weapon to be used against religion.  After all, the 
picture theory of language holds that the sole purpose of language is to depict possible or 
actual states of affairs in the world, and that any proposition failing to meet this 
requirement lacks sense.  Just as this theory of language was used to dispense with 
metaphysics, so it would seem also to dispense with the propositions of theology.  In fact, 
the logical positivists of the Vienna Circle, who held the Tractatus as their bible, did 
indeed construe the picture theory of meaning as an attack on religion.  The last line of 
the Tractatus reads, “What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.”14  Otto 
Neurath’s reaction to this line typifies the interpretation of the Vienna Circle:  “one 
should indeed be silent, but not about anything.”  What Wittgenstein seems to imply in 
this closing line of the Tractatus is that anything which cannot be properly spoken about 
                                               
14
 Tractatus, 89. 
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according to the picture theory of language is something one should remain silent about.  
In other words, if language is not being used as a descriptive device to talk about the 
world of experience, then one should be silent about the matter so as to avoid the misuse 
of language.  Neurath’s point is to add the idea that there is nothing of substance beyond 
the world of experience for one to say something about in the first place.  
The interpretation offered by the members of the Vienna Circle could not have 
been further from Wittgenstein’s own intentions.  When attempting to get the Tractatus 
published, Wittgenstein sent a letter to a prospective publisher, Ludwig Von Ficker.  In 
the letter, Wittgenstein explains the Tractatus as follows: 
I once wanted to give a few words in the foreword which now actually are not in it, which, 
however, I’ll write to you now because they might be a key for you: I wanted to write that my 
work consists of two parts: of the one which is here, and of everything which I have not written. 
And precisely this second part is the important one. For the Ethical is delimited from within, as it 
were, by my book; and I’m convinced that, strictly speaking, it can ONLY be delimited in this 
way. In brief, I think: All of that which many are babbling today, I have defined in my book by 
remaining silent about it.15  
 
For Wittgenstein there are things which fall outside the realm of what is sayable.  It is the 
last few pages of the Tractatus which the Vienna Circle chose to overlook or to ignore.  
At 6.522 we find, “There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make 
themselves manifest. They are what is mystical.”16  As outlined above, the Tractatus is an 
attempt to demarcate what can be said from what cannot be said.  Yet it is those things 
which cannot be said that are for Wittgenstein the most important.  At 6.52 he says, “We 
                                               
15
 “Letters to Ludwig von Ficker,” ed. Allin Janick, trans. Bruce Gillette, in Wittgenstein: Sources and 
Perspectives, ed. C.G. Luckhardt. Hassocks: Harvester Press, 1979: 82-98. 
16
 Tractatus, 89. 
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feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the problems of 
life remain completely untouched.”17  
 But what does Wittgenstein have in mind when he speaks of ‘the mystical’?  At 
6.4 he states, “All propositions are of the same value.”18  If the state of affairs described 
by a proposition exists, then that proposition has a truth-value of true.  Thus, all 
propositions which describe an existing state of affairs are of an equal value.  However, 
this type of value, according to the picture theory of meaning, is due to the existence of a 
fact (a state of affairs in the world).  According to this theory then, a proposition has 
nothing to do with value, but only with fact.  The Tractatus continues at 6.41,  
The sense of the world must lie outside the world.  In the world everything is as it is, and everything 
happens as it does happen: in it no value exists—and if it did exist, it would have no value. 
If there is any value that does have value, it must lie outside the whole sphere of what happens and is 
the case. For all that happens and is the case is accidental. 
What makes it non-accidental cannot lie within the world, since if it did it would itself be accidental.  
It must lie outside the world.19 
 
For Wittgenstein, the world is the totality of facts (states of affairs), and these are 
accidental.  Matters of value, and here he has in mind ethical, aesthetic, and religious 
matters, cannot be mere accidents.  They are what he calls matters of ‘absolute value.’  If 
these things cannot be mere accidents, then they must have their source outside the world 
of facts.  Thus, ‘the mystical’ is the realm of ‘absolute value,’ outside the world of fact.  
If the mystical lies outside the world of facts, then it also lies beyond the capability of 
language to say something about it because there are no objects for the words of a 
                                               
17
 Ibid., 88. 
18
 Ibid., 86. 
19
 Ibid., 86. 
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proposition to correspond with.  At 6.42 we find this point made explicit, “Propositions 
can state nothing that is higher.”20    
 Turning more specifically to the religious, we find the statement, “How things are 
in the world is a matter of complete indifference for what is higher.  God does not reveal 
himself in the world.”21  As with all matters pertaining to the mystical, Wittgenstein holds 
that God, if there is a god, is not in the world.  God is part of that which is higher, and 
hence is outside the world and transcendent.  
Just as Kant limited knowledge in order to make room for faith, we find 
Wittgenstein limiting what is sayable (and thus thinkable) in order to make room for the 
mystical.  In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein has limited the role of what science can 
legitimately say.  Science cannot provide us with answers relating to matters of absolute 
value.  At 6.4321 we find, “The facts all contribute only to setting the problem, not to its 
solution.”22  Science can tell us about how things stand in the world, but this will not 
bring us any closer to answering the questions that are for Wittgenstein the most 
important, matters of absolute value.  “It is not how things are in the world that is 
mystical, but that it exists.”23 
Of course we find people attempting to say things that are religious and ethical all 
the time.  Wittgenstein tells us in his notebooks from this period that he would not 
ridicule such people for one minute.  These are matters of the utmost importance.  But we 
                                               
20
 Ibid., 86. 
21
 Ibid., 88. 
22
 Ibid., 88. 
23
 Ibid., 88. 
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might ask, if our propositions have no sense when we attempt to say something about the 
religious, then why should we respect people’s attempt to use language in this way?  An 
answer may be found in Wittgenstein’s “Lecture on Ethics,” which he gave to a group at 
Cambridge eight years after the publication of the Tractatus.  In the lecture Wittgenstein 
says, “My whole tendency and I believe the tendency of all men who have ever tried to 
write or talk Ethics or Religion was to run against the boundaries of language.  This 
running against the walls of our cage is perfectly, absolutely hopeless.”24  To say 
something about the mystical is an urge that has always been in human beings.   Yet 
while we strive to say something about these matters, we can only dash ourselves against 
the boundaries of our language.  While it may be a hopeless endeavor to attempt to say 
something about these matters, however, it does not follow that they are unimportant or 
that we should disregard them.   
 
III. Philosophical Investigations 
We have examined Wittgenstein early philosophy as found in the Tractatus, and 
also looked at the place of religion within the Tractarian framework.  Let us now consider 
Wittgenstein’s rejection of this thought and the development of his later philosophy.  
Upon completion of the Tractatus (published in 1921), Wittgenstein felt that he had 
solved all the problems of philosophy, and thus, left the field.  It was only after being 
sought out by and engaging in a number of discussions with Frank Ramsey of Cambridge 
                                               
24
 Ludwig Wittgenstein, “A Lecture on Ethics,” in Philosophical Occasions ed. James Klagge and Alfred 
Nordmann. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993. 
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and members of the Vienna Circle, as well as hearing a lecture on the philosophy of 
mathematics given by Brouwer (founder of intuitionist mathematics), that Wittgenstein 
decided to return to Cambridge and his work on philosophy in 1929.   
Ramsey was attempting to revise Russell’s project of providing a logical 
foundation for mathematics by utilizing the theory of logic Wittgenstein had laid out in 
the Tractatus.  Over the course of Wittgenstein’s discussions with Ramsey, a number of 
problems became apparent with the system of the Tractatus.  It was the realization of 
these problems that propelled Wittgenstein back into philosophy.        
The initial problem, the realization of which led to the unraveling of the 
Tractatus, has been called the color-exclusion problem.  The propositions ‘A is red all 
over’ and ‘A is green all over’ are logically incompatible.  According to the Tractatus 
these two propositions would have to be analyzed into logically independent 
propositions.  Realizing that this cannot be done, and that there are logical entailments 
between any propositions ‘attributing a determinate property out of a determinable 
range,’ Wittgenstein abandoned the idea that elementary propositions are logically 
independent.  However, this idea was the linchpin of the conception of logic found in the 
Tractatus.  “Without it, Wittgenstein had to acknowledge that there are logical relations 
which are not the result of truth-functional composition.  ‘A is red’ and ‘A is green’ are 
logically incompatible even though their conjunction is not a contradiction that could be 
displayed by a truth-table”25 Along with the collapse of the logical independence of 
elementary propositions, goes the doctrine of the essential bipolarity of elementary 
                                               
25
 Glock, 12. 
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propositions, as well as the idea that there is a single propositional form requiring that all 
meaningful propositions are the function of truth-functional elementary propositions.    
In time Wittgenstein saw that there were problems not just for the Tractarian 
theory of logic, but also for the doctrine of logical atomism and the picture theory of 
meaning.  The ontology of logical atomism, which held that the world is a collection of 
facts rather than of things, could not be maintained.  Facts are not concatenations of 
objects and cannot be located in space and time, nor are they extra-linguistic entities 
against which a proposition can be measured.  Further, the idea that there must be 
absolutely simple objects to which words correspond is confused.  The notions of 
‘simple’ and ‘complex’ are relative.  “The squares of a chessboard, for example, may be 
simple for the purpose of playing the game, but may be complex for the purpose of 
producing the board.”26   If the notion of absolutely simple objects is confused, then the 
central idea of the picture theory of meaning holding that there exist words that are 
absolutely semantically simple is equally confused. 
As Wittgenstein was beginning to realize these problems with the Tractatus, a 
conversation with the Marxist economist Piero Sraffa would cause him to also relinquish 
the notion that a proposition must be a picture of what it describes.  In the course of this 
conversation, Wittgenstein was insisting to Sraffa that a proposition and what it describes 
must have the same logical form, in response to which, Sraffa made a Neapolitan gesture 
of contempt by brushing his fingers outward under his chin, and asking, “What is the 
logical form of that?”  In the preface to the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein 
                                               
26
 Glock, 13. 
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remarked on Sraffa’s criticisms, stating, “I am indebted to this stimulus for the most 
consequential ideas of this book.”27  Elsewhere Wittgenstein would elaborate on the 
credit he gave to Sraffa, indicating that it was Sraffa who prompted him to view 
philosophical problems from an anthropological perspective.  
Indeed an anthropological perspective on the problems of philosophy is what we 
find in the Philosophical Investigations, the masterpiece of Wittgenstein’s later thought.  
Where the Tractatus had envisioned a ‘scientific world,’ the Philosophical Investigations 
envisions a ‘human world.’  Wittgenstein actually intended to publish the Investigations 
and the Tractatus together at one point, as the Investigations is in many ways a criticism 
of the Tractatus and may be best understood in contrast with it.  However, the 
Investigations represent not just a critique of the Tractatus, but of the whole 
philosophical tradition to which the Tractatus belongs. 
Philosophical Investigations begins with a quotation from St. Augustine’s 
Confessions: 
When they (my elders) named some object, and accordingly moved toward something, I saw this 
and I grasped that the thing was called by the sound they uttered when they meant to point it out. 
Their intention was shewn by their bodily movements, as it were the natural language of all 
peoples: the expression of the face, the play of the eyes, the movement of other parts of the body, 
and the tone of voice which expresses our state of mind in seeking, having, rejecting, or avoiding 
meaning. Thus, as I heard words repeatedly used in their proper places in various sentences, I 
gradually learnt to understand what objects they signified; and after I had trained my mouth to 
form these signs, I used them to express my own desires.28  
                                               
27
 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 3rd ed., trans. G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell, 
2001. x. 
28
 Philosophical Investigations, 2. 
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Commentators have referred to this passage in which Augustine recounts how he learned 
to speak as the ‘Augustinian theory of meaning,’ and it is this theory of language that will 
become the focus of Wittgenstein’s attention.  He goes on to say of this theory,  
These words…give us a particular picture of the essence of human language. It is this: the 
individual words in language name objects—sentences are combinations of such names.—In this 
picture of language we find the roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. This 
meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands.29 
 
The Augustinian theory of meaning is really just a less sophisticated version of the 
Tractarian theory of meaning.  What Wittgenstein wants to show is that this picture of 
language, which can be found throughout the history of philosophy, distorts our view of 
how language actually functions. 
 There is a constant temptation to think that the meaning of a word is that to which 
it refers.  However, asks Wittgenstein, what do words such as ‘Help!,’ ‘Ow!,’ ‘Fine!,’ and 
‘No!’ refer to?  “Are you still inclined to call these words ‘names of objects’?”30  In 
actuality, there are countless ways in which we use language, and referring to objects is 
the purpose of just one family of words within our language.  Wittgenstein goes on to 
compare words with tools.  “Think of the tools in a toolbox: there is a hammer, pliers, a 
saw, a screw-driver, a rule, a glue-pot, glue, nails and screws.—The function of words are 
as diverse as the function of these objects.”31  Sentences are conceived of in a similar 
manner, as ‘instruments’ that are employed in different ways.  
By describing language in this manner, Wittgenstein is directing us to resist the 
desire to construct a general theory of language or to search for a general form of 
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language.  “It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools in language and of the 
ways they are used, the multiplicity of the kinds of word and sentence, with what 
logicians have said about the structure of language. (Including the author of the Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophcus.)”32  The portrayal of the multiplicity of language set out in the 
Investigations is a stark contrast with the monolithic vision given in the Tractatus.   
In place of the picture theory of meaning, the Investigations instruct us to find the 
meaning of a word by looking to its use.  “For a large class of cases—though not for 
all—in which we employ the word ‘meaning’ it can be defined thus: the meaning of a 
word is its use in the language.”33  A much more dynamic picture of language begins to 
emerge than the one found in the Tractatus.  Wittgenstein points us to the vast array of 
ways in which language is actually used within the context of human life and social 
activities.  To this end Wittgenstein draws an analogy between language and games.  
When we use words, we use them in much the same way as we use pieces to play a game 
such as chess.  We play the game of chess by following rules governing how the pieces 
may be moved.  Similarly, we can think of language as part of rule-governed activities 
which Wittgenstein refers to as ‘language-games.’  The rules of any game are arbitrary, 
yet within that game, they determine how it is to be played.  The rules of a game are not 
measured against how well they represent reality (i.e. the Tractatus), nor are they 
measured in terms of the rules of another game.   
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Another purpose for Wittgenstein drawing the analogy between language and 
games is to elucidate his contention that we must resist our desire for generality.  This has 
already been pointed to in the idea that language has no general form.  If one wanted to 
argue that Wittgenstein had merely failed to identify the essence of language, he 
developed the notion of ‘family resemblance’ to combat this criticism.   
Consider for example the proceedings that we call ‘games.’ I mean board-games, card-games, 
ball-games, Olympic games, and so on. What is common to them all?—Don’t say: ‘There must be 
something common, or they would not be called “games”’—but look and see whether there is 
anything common to all.—For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to 
all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that. To repeat: don’t think, but 
look!…..I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than ‘family 
resemblances’; for the various resemblances between members of a family: build, features, colour 
of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way.—And I shall say: 
‘games’ form a family.34  
 
The notion of ‘family resemblance’ captures the idea that language-games do not 
necessarily have one thing in common, but rather have overlapping similarities.  A 
certain pair of language-games may have overall features in common, while another pair 
has only details in common.  The mistake of the Tractatus was to assume that one family 
of concepts—scientific concepts—reveal the general form of the totality of language.  
 The language-game motif is meant to elucidate the essentially social nature of 
language.  “Here the term ‘language-game’ is meant to bring into prominence the fact 
that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life.”35  We can usually 
get clear about the meaning of a term by describing its use.  However, we must describe 
the activity or form of life in which the term is used in order to properly make sense of 
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this usage.  Language is interwoven with non-linguistic activities, and it must be 
understood in this context. 
 Finally, something must be said about the task of philosophy as conceived in 
Wittgenstein’s later thought.  Here again we find a sharp break between Wittgenstein and 
the philosophical tradition.  Plato held that philosophy gave us knowledge of ultimate 
reality, while Locke held that philosophy cleared away rubbish that stands in the way of 
scientific knowledge, and Bertrand Russell that philosophy would ‘enlarge our thoughts’ 
and keep alive our sense of wonder at the universe.  For the later Wittgenstein, 
philosophical problems are confusions of language, and the task of philosophy is to bring 
clarity to these confusions. 
 Wittgenstein points out that we know how to use our language very well; we do 
so everyday.  However, when we begin to reflect upon our language, rather than simply 
use it, we enter into confusion.  “The confusions which occupy us arise when language is 
like an engine idling, not when it is doing its work.”36  Also, “Philosophical problems 
arise when language goes on holiday.”37  Here we notice the emphasis on the everyday 
over the reflections of philosophy.  This also comes out in Wittgenstein’s criticisms of 
the Tractatus, in which it was held that one had to understand the factual situation 
represented by a proposition and the atomic objects that comprise the situation, before 
one was able to perfectly understand the proposition.  In fact, we perfectly well 
understand countless propositions everyday without understanding these things.  The 
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same can be said of mathematics.  We use math perfectly well everyday without 
understanding the attempts to ground mathematics undertaken in the philosophy of 
mathematics. 
 As philosophical problems are merely confusions, they are not so much to be 
solved as dissolved.  This task is to be achieved by reminding ourselves of the everyday 
usage of the concept around which the confusion has arisen.   
When philosophers use a word—‘knowledge,’ ‘being,’ ‘object,’ ‘I,’ ‘proposition,’ ‘name’—and 
try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in 
this way in the language-game which is its original home?  
What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use.38  
 
Wittgenstein solution to philosophical problems is the notion that we must ‘command a 
clear view of the use of our words’ by giving what he calls a ‘perspicuous representation’ 
of the language.  A perspicuous representation will show the diversity of uses that a part 
of language has in an attempt to bring clarity to the confusion which has ensued.  
Philosophy has no doctrines and no theses, as there is no one explanation that can free us 
from all confusions.  Instead, each philosophical problem will require its own treatment 
and method of dissolution. 
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Chapter 2 
 
 
 This chapter will begin by laying out Norman Malcolm’s interpretation of 
Wittgenstein’s later thought in relation to religion.  I will then turn to Peter Winch’s 
critique of Malcolm’s interpretation, while also setting out Winch’s alternative reading.  
Next, I will review Kai Nielsen’s classic critique of these ‘Wittgensteinian philosophers 
of religion,’ as well as a more recent critique that Nielsen has offered.  Finally, this 
chapter will conclude with my own critique of this debate. 
 
I. Malcolm 
 In his essay, Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View?39, Norman Malcolm 
considers what Wittgenstein may have meant by his remark, “I am not a religious man 
but I cannot help seeing every problem from a religious point of view.”  In the same 
conversation with M. O’C. Drury in which Wittgenstein made this remark, he went on to 
comment, “My type of thinking is not wanted in this present age; I have to swim so 
strongly against the tide.”   Wittgenstein’s remarks made Drury worry that there are 
dimensions of the Philosophical Investigations being ignored, and also to worry whether 
he (Drury) himself understood that the problems in this work are being seen from a 
‘religious point of view.’  Malcolm, in writing this essay at the end of his life, has the 
same concerns.  In fact, he questions whether his whole understanding of Wittgenstein’s 
thought may be threatened.    
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 Malcolm begins his essay by telling us that in this remark, Wittgenstein was not 
referring to the problems of poverty, disease, crime, war, and the like, but to 
philosophical problems.  “The ‘problems’ he meant are philosophical: those very 
complexities and confusions with which he grapples in the Investigations.”40  To most 
people the suggestion that the problems discussed in the Investigations are being seen 
from a religious perspective would come as quite a surprise.  There are certainly not any 
explicitly religious ideas present in the work.   
Malcolm points us to a passage from Philosophical Investigations: “Philosophy 
simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything.”41  Here 
Wittgenstein is proposing a radical change in what philosophy ought to be doing.  It is 
certainly not a description of how philosophy has been, or still is, practiced.  “The 
traditional aim of philosophy has been to explain the essential nature of justice, right and 
wrong, duty, the good, beauty, art, language, rules, thought.”42  Unlike scientists, 
however, philosophers do not seek to give explanations in terms of the natural processes 
of the world.  Rather, they offer explanations in terms of the meaning of words.   
Usually the concentration was on truth-conditions.  When you say that you know so-and-so, what 
are the necessary and sufficient conditions that must be satisfied in order for your assertion to be 
true?  If a philosopher could spell out those conditions he would be giving a definition of the 
meaning of ‘know.’  He would have given a logical analysis, or a philosophical analysis, of 
knowledge.  This would be an ‘explanation’ of what knowledge is, what it consists of.43 
 
But if philosophy, as Wittgenstein has it, is not supposed to be seeking out and 
providing explanations, then what should it be doing?  “The task of philosophy is to 
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describe.  Describe what?  Describe concepts.  How does one describe concepts?  By 
describing the use of the word, or those words, that express the concept.  This is what 
philosophy should ‘put before us.’”44  It is this task of describing concepts that 
Wittgenstein had in mind when he spoke of describing the language-game with a word.  
He also referred to it as describing the ‘grammar of a word.’ 
Wittgenstein did not intend that philosophers should describe the use of a word in 
its totality.  Rather, the philosopher is to describe those aspects of the use of a word that 
lead to philosophical perplexity.  Included in this method is the comparison and contrast 
of the use of one word with the use of others.  Through comparison with the use of 
related words, we may also come to a deeper understanding of a concept in question. 
Malcolm emphasizes that the idea of a language-game implies that language is 
part of a form of life, in other words, language is “embedded in actions and reactions—in 
human behaviour.”  Thus, describing the language-game, or the grammar of a word, 
involves more than a simple account of sentence-construction or syntax.  The philosopher 
must describe how the word is used within the context of the human behavior of which it 
is a part.  
We are asked to consider the language-game of the word ‘intention.’  When a 
person declares that he intends to do something, this normally results in a presumption 
that he will do it.  Others have a right to expect that he will carry out his intentions and 
that they will be able to plan accordingly.  “This is not a moral but a logical right.  It 
belongs to the grammar of the words ‘I intend to do X,’ that others are entitled to expect 
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the speaker to do X.”45  If a person never or hardly ever carried out his announced 
intentions, then his words would not be taken seriously.  In this case, “His ‘I intend’ 
might be treated the same as ‘I would like.’  An implicit promise of doing is part of the 
meaning of ‘I intend.’”46  
This brief consideration of the language-game of intention demonstrates that the 
word is embedded in a pattern of human activity; it has its place within a network of 
action and reaction, what Wittgenstein called a form of life.  When a person declares his 
or her intentions, that person normally carries out the action.  If the person does not carry 
out the action, then he or she will usually give an explanation or reason for why the 
action was not carried out.  “These are explanations within the language-game with the 
word ‘intention.’”47  What this shows is that language-games provide a place for 
explanations, reasons, and justifications.  “For reasons for having that intention; for 
explanation and justification for not fulfilling it.”48   
Malcolm draws our attention to a passage from On Certainty, a work Wittgenstein 
was developing up till his death:  “You must bear in mind that the language-game is, so 
to speak, something unforeseeable.  I mean: it is not based on grounds.  Not reasonable 
(or unreasonable).  It stands there—like our life.”49  There are two important points to be 
drawn from this passage.  First, it represents a sharp distinction with the Tractatus, which 
held that there was an essential nature to propositions, an essence of language.  This 
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passage is saying that “there is no common nature of saying something—that the 
phenomena of language have no formal unity.”50  Here words have their meaning only 
within a particular language-game.  The language-games have an internal connection 
with the forms of life, or human actions, of which they are a part.  The second point to be 
taken from this passage involves the comparison between language-games and human 
life.  While both are unforeseeable and inexplicable, this is not a comparison between two 
separate things, but of two inextricably intertwined things.  Our life is expressed in 
language.  “Certainly there could be no criticism or reflection without language.  Nor 
anything that would come close to resembling human love, or hope, or hatred or joy.  The 
observation and description of language-games, if it is sensitive and detailed, is actually a 
study of human life.”51  To study our language-games is to study our form of human life. 
However, there is no explanation of the language-game itself.  “There is no 
explanation for that particular form of life, that pattern of action and reaction with which 
the word ‘intention’ is internally connected.  It was not invented by people because they 
foresaw some advantage in it, as they invent tools and machines.  It was not invented at 
all—anymore than was talking or thinking.”52  A language-game may be a part of our 
form of life, of our culture, but it need not be a part of every form of life that a people 
may share.  “There could be a people who did not have any word that functions like our 
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word ‘intention,’ nor engaged in that related pattern of activity—just as there could be a 
people who did not have our interest in sport, or in art.”53   
According to Malcolm, Wittgenstein emphasized that explanations must come to 
an end, and where this occurs is at the existence of language-games and their associated 
forms of life.  “The inescapable logic of this conception is that the terms ‘explanation,’ 
‘reason,’ ‘justification,’ have a use exclusively within the various language-games.”54  
There is an internal connection between words and the language-games of which they are 
a part, meaning the grammatical or linguistic rules of the language-game provide the 
word with its meaning.  If this internal connection between word and language-game 
holds, then there is no meaning of the concept ‘explanation’ which transcends this 
context.  Malcolm explains this as follows: “An explanation is internal to a particular 
language-game.  There is no explanation that rises above our language-game, and 
explains them.  This would be a super-concept of explanation—which means that it is an 
ill-conceived fantasy.”55  There are many different concepts of ‘explanation,’ each 
operating within a particular language-game.  A language-game itself, however, cannot 
be explained, but only observed and described.     
On Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy, the subject matter of philosophy is 
philosophical confusion.  These confusions arise from entanglements of our concepts.  
“The task of philosophy is not to explain deep mysteries, but to bring clarification and 
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therefore light to our thinking.”56  Philosophy has a descriptive task, though this is in no 
way a theoretical one.  There are no essential definitions of concepts to be discovered or 
theorized about, nor are we to formulate theoretical hypotheses about why we have these 
concepts as opposed to others.  In the Investigations, Wittgenstein says of the task of the 
philosopher, “And we may not advance any kind of theory.  There must not be anything 
hypothetical in our considerations.  We must do away with all explanation, and 
description alone must take its place.  And this description gets its light, that is to say, its 
purpose, from the philosophical problems.”57   
Another reason philosophy is descriptive, rather than theoretical, is because we 
already possess all the information that we need.  There is nothing new for philosophy to 
discover.  Philosophical confusions have their source in the concepts of our everyday 
language-games.  “What are called philosophical ‘problems’ are actually confusions—
confusions about our own concepts, the grammar of our own language, our familiar 
language-games.”58  We engage in various language-games every day of our lives, and 
we know very well how to use the words within these language-games.  A philosopher 
cannot teach us anything new about the grammar of our words.  “A philosopher cannot 
teach this to us—we learned it a long time ago.  What he can do is to remind us of 
something that we already know.  He can remind us of fine differences between 
concepts—differences which we observe in practice in our everyday activities—but 
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which we tend to forget when we engage in intellectual reflection.”59  The philosopher 
reminds us of that which we already know, but may become confused about upon 
reflection.  Thus, on Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy, explanation is done away 
with and all that remains is description.  As he says in the Investigations, “Our mistake is 
to look for an explanation where we should see the facts as ‘primary phenomena.’  That 
is, where we should say: this language game is played.”60    
After this consideration of Wittgenstein’s later thought, Malcolm believes that we 
can draw four analogies between it and a religious point of view.  The first analogy lies in 
a certain attitude toward explanation.  “A possible clue may lie in the reiterated theme of 
[Wittgenstein’s] writings, that explanation, reasons, justifications, come to an end.”61  In 
religious thinking there is an end to explanation, holds Malcolm.  For example, parents 
who have lost a child may be offered the words, “The Lord hath given; The Lord hath 
taken away. Blessed is the name of the Lord.”  While these words would not provide 
consolation to all people who find themselves in such a situation, they may provide 
comfort to those with strong religious beliefs.  Notice that these words bring explanation 
to an end and that there is no place for justification beyond them.   
When the search for an explanation, a reason, a justification, is brought to an end in the 
acknowledgement that it was God’s will—that is a religious response.  There is a religious attitude 
which would regard as meaningless, or ignorant, or presumptuous, any demand for God’s reason 
or justification, or any attempt to explain why He willed, or permitted, this disaster to occur.62 
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For a certain religious attitude, God’s will is the point at which explanation terminates.  
There is no going beyond it and no justification for it.   
     Malcolm points us to the story of Job as an exemplar of this sort of attitude 
toward explanation.  Job was a faithful and blameless man.  He was also wealthy and 
prosperous.  However, one day many tragedies befell Job: his flocks were destroyed, his 
children were killed when a house collapsed on them, and his body became covered in 
sores.  Job became angry about these things which were happening to him, insisting that 
he was ‘a just and blameless man’ and that he did not deserve them.  He wished to argue 
his case before God, declaring, “He will slay me; I have no hope; yet I will defend my 
ways to His face.”63  Then God spoke to Job, saying, “Will you condemn me that you 
may be justified?….Who can stand before me?  Who has given to me, that I should repay 
him?  Whatever is under the whole heaven is mine.”64  Job is shaken by God’s words and 
declares, “I know that thou canst do all things, and no purpose of thine can be 
thwarted….Therefore I have uttered what I did not understand, things too wonderful for 
me, which I did not know….I had heard of Thee by the hearing of the ear, but now my 
eyes sees thee; therefore I despise myself, and repent in dust and ashes.”65  Malcolm tells 
us the point of this myth, as he interprets it, is to give us a sense of the concept of God.  
“It shows that the notion of there being a reason for His deeds has no application to God; 
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nor the notion of there being a justification or an explanation for God’s actions.  God 
stands in no need of justifying or of explaining His ways to mankind.”66  
While a religious point of view may hold God’s will as a point at which 
explanation ends, Wittgenstein’s philosophy, in an analogous manner, holds that 
language-games and their associated forms of life are a point at which explanation ends.  
“The analogy to philosophy is that reasons, justifications, explanations, reach a terminus 
in the language-games and their internally related forms of human life.  The assumption 
that everything can be explained filled Wittgenstein with a kind of fury.”67  Philosophy 
can only observe and describe the language-games in which we engage.  It cannot give an 
explanation of why these practices exist.   
Religion is itself one such language-game.  “A religious practice is itself a 
language-game—a pattern in which words and gestures are interwoven in acts of 
worship, prayer, confession, absolution, thanksgiving.”68  As with any language-game, 
we cannot explain why religion exists.   
Religious practices are a part of the natural history of mankind and are no more explicable than 
any other feature of this natural history.  It is not an explanation to say that religious practices 
arise from ‘a basic religious impulse’—any more than it is to say that bodies fall to the earth 
because of the force of gravity.  The existence of religious practices can no more be explained than 
can the existence of sports, or of musical composition.69 
 
While reference to the will of God may put an end to explanation from a religious 
point of view, this reference is not meant to function as an explanation.  “If it were meant 
as an explanation, then the same explanation would explain everything….An explanation 
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that explains everything in the same way, actually explains nothing.”70  When we give 
attention to how this reference to the will of God functions within a religious perspective, 
we see that it is a way of bringing comfort.  It is “…an attempt to bring to an end the 
torment of asking ‘Why did it have to happen?’—an attempt to give the tormented one 
rest, to provide peace.”71 
The second analogy between a religious point of view and Wittgenstein’s 
conception of philosophy lies in a notion that Wittgenstein spoke about in his ‘Lecture on 
Ethics,’ given in 1929.  “Wittgenstein said that sometimes he ‘wondered at the existence 
of the world,’ and that he thought that this was the experience of ‘seeing the world as a 
miracle.’”72  This ‘seeing the world as a miracle’ is something that religious people 
commonly speak about.  It is a wonder that there is anything rather than nothing.  We 
find a similar attitude toward language-games in some of Wittgenstein’s later writings, an 
expression of a kind of wonder at their existence.  While language-games come into and 
go out of existence in the course of human history, there is no predicting how this will 
occur.  “New language-games are not based on grounds or reasons, and therefore cannot 
be foreseen.”73   
The wonder at the existence of our language-games is not exactly the same as the 
religious sense of wonder at the existence of things.  “This philosophical astonishment is 
not a religious sense of the miraculous—for it does not view the language-games as 
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sacred.”74  Nevertheless, we do find a similarity in the sense of wonder and astonishment.  
“But in respect to the feeling of wonder and mystery, it is analogous to the religious sense 
of the miracle of the world and the miracle of human life.”75 
The third analogy involves the notion that there is something basically wrong with 
human beings.  A religious point of view holds that humans have an inherently sinful 
nature.   
We pursue the idols of wealth and status; we want to be admired; even our love is contaminated 
by jealousy, resentment, hatred; we are quickly offended and slow to forgive; scarcely ever do we 
love others as we love ourselves; we do little in the way of giving drink to those who thirst and 
food to those who hunger; we are beset by anxieties; we fear death.76 
 
A genuinely religious perspective holds that we are spiritually ill even when we feel 
healthy.  Wittgenstein once spoke of this religious perspective, commenting, “People are 
religious in the degree that they believe themselves to be not so much imperfect, as 
ill….Any half-way decent man will think himself extremely imperfect, but a religious 
man believes himself wretched.” 
 When characterizing philosophy as it has traditionally been practiced, 
Wittgenstein would similarly use terms such as ‘illness’ and ‘disease of thinking.’  The 
search for explanations where there are none, the confusions of language in which we 
become entangled, these are the symptoms of the illness of philosophical confusion.  
“The analogy only means that in both cases something is wrong with us—on the one 
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hand, in the way we live and feel and regard others; on the other hand, in the way we 
think when we encounter a philosophical question.”77  
 The fourth and final analogy between a religious point of view and Wittgenstein’s 
later philosophy involves the notion of the priority of action over thinking or reflection.  
For Wittgenstein there is no value in intellectual proofs of God’s existence.  “For him the 
crucial aspect of serious religious feeling is the emphasis on ‘changing one’s life,’ 
‘amending one’s ways,’ ‘helping others’….Wittgenstein would have agreed with St. 
James that ‘Faith, without works, is dead.’”78  This view of religious belief is made very 
explicit in a journal entry Wittgenstein made in 1946. 
One of the things Christianity says, I think, is that all sound doctrines are of no avail.  One must 
change one’s life.  (Or the direction of one’s life). 
That all wisdom is cold; and that one can no more use it to bring one’s life into order than one can 
forge cold iron. 
A sound doctrine does not have to catch hold of one; one can follow it like a doctor’s 
prescription.—But here something must grasp one and turn one around.—(This is how I 
understand it.)  Once turned around, one must stay turned around.   
Wisdom is passionless.  In contrast faith is what Kierkegaard calls a passion. 
 
In his later philosophy, Wittgenstein makes the comparison between language and 
games, while emphasizing that in playing games the players must act.  This is designed to 
point out the fact that our linguistic concepts are rooted in action and activity rather than 
in reasoning and interpreting.  “Throughout his philosophical work Wittgenstein is 
attempting to locate the basis of our concepts in pre-linguistic, pre-rational actions and 
reactions.  It is not from intuitions, nor convictions, nor any kind of reasoning, that our 
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language-games emerge—but from ‘our acting.’”79  Thus, the fourth analogy lies in the 
relation between the notion that our concepts ultimately rest upon a basis of human action 
and the notion that what is most fundamental in a religious life is doing good deeds as 
opposed to intellectually assenting to some creed or embracing some theological theory. 
 
II. Winch 
Peter Winch has provided a critique of Malcolm’s interpretation of Wittgenstein, 
as well as offered an alternative reading.  In this section I will set out this critique and 
alternative reading.  
Winch believes Malcolm to be largely correct about Wittgenstein’s attitude 
toward explanation, but is concerned about the emphasis which Malcolm gives to it.  “I 
have no doubt that Malcolm is right in discerning such a pervasive attitude to explanation 
in Wittgenstein’s writing.  All the same, I find myself profoundly uneasy at the kind of 
emphasis he gives to it.”80  The primary thing lacking is an account of the kind of puzzles 
that have led traditional philosophers to seek the sorts of explanations that they do.  This 
search for explanation has been driven by a certain view of what logic requires of a 
significant utterance. 
It has seemed to them that the logical consequences that can be drawn from such as utterance must 
be precisely determined by the meaning which it bears at the time at which it is made; and that, 
furthermore, that meaning, i.e. all the necessary and sufficient conditions of the use of the 
utterance, must be intended, meant, by the utterer at the time of the utterance, since otherwise the 
utterer will be at full liberty to accept or refuse a given consequence at random and no one will 
ever know with certainty what anyone (including him or herself) is actually saying.81 
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If these conditions are not met, it is felt, then no one would be genuinely saying anything.   
 
 It is important for two reasons to give proper attention to the role of puzzles that 
drive the philosophical search for explanation.  The first is that it shows the type of 
explanation that Wittgenstein wished to warn philosophers against.  We should not seek 
those explanations “which provide users of the language with a justification for using 
words in the way they do.”82  The second reason is that Wittgenstein goes far beyond a 
warning against these types of explanation in his writing, with the majority of his 
attention directed to the difficulties giving rise to the search for these explanations.   
Wittgenstein never thought that convincing the philosopher that explanations come to an end 
would be enough to stop the obsessional insistence on asking unanswerable questions.  The real 
work that had to be done was to make clear the misunderstanding from which that insistence 
arose.  Arriving at clarity concerning the limits of explanation would be, at most, a stage on the 
way.83  
 
The problem with Malcolm’s emphasis is that it would lead us to believe 
Wittgenstein was guided by the question, ‘Where do explanations end?’  This perspective 
may lead to Spinoza’s notion of a causa sui.  On this view, explanations must come to an 
end because there must be something that has no further explanation.  Wittgenstein’s 
purpose, however, was to criticize this type of outlook.   
He does not think that explanations come to an end with something that is intrinsically beyond 
further explanation.  They come to an end for a variety of quite contingent and pragmatic reasons, 
perhaps because of a practical need for action, perhaps because the puzzlement which originally 
prompted the search for explanation has evaporated (for one reason or another).84 
 
The practical matters of human life are what bring explanation to an end. 
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 It is also misleading for Malcolm to claim that Wittgenstein believed language-
games and their associated forms of life to be beyond explanation.  “Language-games are 
not phenomena that Wittgenstein had discovered with the peculiar property that their 
existence cannot be explained!”85  Again, Wittgenstein was primarily concerned to 
expose the confusion involved in the search for certain types of explanation and the 
puzzles that give rise to it.  “The concept of a language-game has to be understood as a 
logical instrument in the service of that exposure.”86  The notion of a language-game is 
meant to serve as a tool for Wittgenstein’s diagnosis of traditional philosophy.  In fact, he 
thought that hypothetical language-games we invent may be as useful for this purpose as 
consideration of our actual existing language-games.  “His appeal is to be understood not 
as: ‘Look, here is something that cannot be explained,’ but rather, ‘Look at things from 
this point of view; then you will see the difficulties that you are trying to deal with are not 
going to be dealt with through any sort of explanation of the sort you are seeking.’”87    
 Wittgenstein did not believe that language-games and our social practices are 
beyond all attempts at scientific explanation.  The sciences often provide well-founded 
explanations for the sorts of questions those disciplines are concerned with.  The issue is 
what bearing these type of explanations have for the sorts of problems philosophers are 
concerned with.   
As far as the ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ sciences (as distinct from philosophy) are concerned, Wittgenstein’s 
point was not, I believe, that language-games are intrinsically beyond the power of these sciences 
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to provide explanations, but rather that any explanation they might offer would turn out to be quite 
uninteresting and useless as far as the philosopher’s characteristic puzzlement is concerned.88  
 
The scientists’ explanations say nothing about the sort of pseudo-explanations that 
philosophers seek.  The rationalism of Spinoza’s causa sui, for example, was what 
Wittgenstein wanted to expose as senseless.  Scientific explanations do nothing to 
elucidate this kind of puzzlement. 
After making these points about Malcolm’s general interpretation of 
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, Winch turns to Malcolm’s interpretation of 
Wittgenstein’s remark that he could not help seeing all problems from a religious point of 
view.  Winch questions Malcolm’s assertion that Wittgenstein meant philosophical 
problems when he said this.  First, there are non-philosophical problems in Wittgenstein’s 
writings and reported conversations that seem to be seen from a religious or quasi-
religious point of view.  “For instance, the problem of how to live with something in 
one’s life of which one is ashamed; the problem of how to conduct oneself in the face of 
death; generally, the problem of how to live a decent life.”89  After all, in his remark, 
Wittgenstein did say that he could not help seeing every problem from this point of view.  
Further, while Wittgenstein may have seen some philosophical problems from a religious 
point of view, it seems that frequently they are not seen from this perspective.  
“Although, of course, they can be looked at from this point of view, they do not have to 
be and perhaps more frequently than not they are not generally seen in this way.”90   
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Secondly, Winch disagrees with the exclusive terms in which Malcolm offers the 
alternatives.  For Malcolm, either Wittgenstein was referring to the social-political 
problems that Malcolm mentions (unemployment, crime, poverty, etc.), or he was 
referring to philosophical problems.  Winch counters, “We may perhaps allow that 
[Wittgenstein] was singling out his attitude to philosophical problems for special 
attention, but there is no reason to think that he was not also expressing an attitude to 
many other sorts of problems as well.”91   
This is an important point because Malcolm’s interpretation rests on the 
assumption that in his remark, Wittgenstein was referring to an analogy between religious 
and philosophical problems.  If we acknowledge that Wittgenstein may have also been 
referring to problems other than philosophical ones, then Malcolm’s search for an 
analogy becomes implausible.  “Are we to say for instance that [Wittgenstein] saw an 
analogy between religious problems and the problems of decency in the manner of one’s 
life?  If we do so, we are in danger of losing our grip on any manageable question.”92  
There would be no end to the search for all the analogies that hold between a religious 
point of view and all the different sorts of problems Wittgenstein considered in the course 
of his life.  However, when we look to the specific wording of Wittgenstein’s remark, we 
find no mention of analogy. 
 Winch thinks it a mistake to search for analogies in this context, and gives 
consideration to the four analogies Malcolm claims to have found between a religious 
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point of view and Wittgenstein’s later thought.  The first analogy involved a certain 
attitude toward explanation.  Winch claims that to properly evaluate Malcolm’s first 
analogy we need to distinguish between two issues: first, religious belief is itself a 
language-game for which it makes no sense to ask for an explanation; second, for a 
religious believer, it is said that a reference to God’s will is an end to explanation.  On the 
first issue, it is misleading to speak of an analogy to philosophy, as the claim that the 
expression of religious belief is a language-game is just itself a philosophical point.  If it 
is a general philosophical point that language-games are beyond explanation, and also 
that religious belief is itself a language-game, then of course religious belief is beyond 
explanation in the same manner as all other language-games.  The second issue, that for a 
religious believer God’s will is an end to explanation, is also to make a philosophical 
point.  In this case it is a philosophical point about a particular feature of a certain 
religious language-game.   
 Given that both issues in Malcolm’s ‘analogy’ amount to philosophical points, 
where does this leave the notion of an analogy?   
If one is to speak of any ‘analogy’ between philosophy and religion at this point, then, I suppose a 
case must be made for saying that the readiness to come to rest at a certain point and say, as it 
were, explanation stops here, plays a role within religion (regarding references to God’s will) 
analogous to the role such a readiness plays in philosophy, as practiced by Wittgenstein (regarding 
references to language-games).93 
 
However, this seems to be a problematic claim.  Wittgenstein constantly warns us against 
too hasty a comparison of things that have a similar surface appearance.  “Practice gives 
the words their sense,” he emphasizes.  If we look at the role this attitude toward 
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explanation plays in each context, we will find something very different.  “The practice 
associated with giving up the demand for explanation in philosophy bears little 
comparison with the giving up the demand for explanation in religion, despite the similar 
words with which we may, in part at least, describe them.”94  The idea of surface 
similarities concealing deep differences is a point on which Winch will rely throughout 
his critique of Malcolm’s analogies. 
 Malcolm’s second analogy involved a sense of wonder common to both religion 
and philosophy.  Winch argues that these two types of wonder are so different that it 
would be weak at best to speak of an analogy between them.  Again Wittgenstein, and 
even Malcolm himself, were keen to argue against confusion based on similarity of 
surface appearances.  This is another case in which we must look beneath the surface. 
When we give close attention to the religious sense of wonder at the existence of 
the world and Wittgenstein’s sense of wonder at the existence of our language-games, we 
find that they are very different.  Winch points to a passage in which Wittgenstein spoke 
about miracles:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A miracle is, as it were, a gesture which God makes. As a man sits quietly and then makes an 
impressive gesture, God lets the world run on smoothly and then accompanies the words of a saint 
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by a symbolic occurrence, a gesture of nature. It would be an instance if, when a saint spoke, the 
trees around him bowed, as if in reverence.—Now, do I believe that this happens? I don’t. 
The only way for me to believe in a miracle in this sense would be to be impressed by an 
occurrence in this particular way. So that I should say e.g.: ‘It was impossible to see these trees, 
and not to feel that they were responding to the words.’….And I can imagine that the mere report 
of the words and life of the saint can make someone believe the reports that the trees bowed. But I 
am not so impressed.95 
 
We notice in this passage that the miraculous involves either seeing something in such a 
way or not seeing it in that way.  ‘Seeing it’ in this context is almost indistinguishable 
from reacting to it in a certain way.  When one sees something as miraculous, that person 
finds it ‘impossible’ not to see it in that way.  In other words, one finds himself unable to 
see it in another way.  Wittgenstein, however, says he is ‘not so impressed.’  Here we 
find evidence that any sense of wonder Wittgenstein felt toward the existence of our 
language-games was not one that involved seeing them as the work of God.  There is an 
infinite distance, claims Winch, between the religious sense of wonder and Wittgenstein 
attitude toward language-games.   
 The third analogy involves a religious notion of our being ‘ill’ and Wittgenstein’s 
diagnosis of philosophical problems as a symptom of a ‘disease of thinking.’  Winch 
levels the same sort of critique against this analogy, namely, that each notion of ‘illness’ 
is dependent on an extremely different context, making any talk of analogy very weak.  
 The fourth and final analogy involves the idea that the crucial element in religion 
is the active ‘changing of one’s life’ and the philosophical point that our everyday 
linguistic concepts require a base of acting or doing.  Malcolm tells us that Wittgenstein 
would have rejected any conception of religion that construes it as basically a ‘doctrine,’ 
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or that understands religion as relying on intellectual ‘proofs of God’s existence.’  
Religion, for Wittgenstein, is not a matter of reasoning.  Malcolm holds that Wittgenstein 
would have agreed with St. James’ claim that ‘faith, without works, is dead.’   
However, contends Winch, the relation between faith and works, as it is 
understood by St. James, is not simply a particular instance of the relation between 
thinking and acting.  Faith has its expression in practice, which St. James means to 
distinguish from mere works, such as church attendance, religious observance, etc.  
“What matters in this context is the qualitative nature of the ‘acting’: namely, for 
instance, that it should be directed at the welfare of one’s fellow human beings rather 
than merely at the observance of religious forms.”96  We may find a person who performs 
good works for all sorts of reasons (upbringing, social pressure, etc.) which have nothing 
to do with faith.  Alternatively, we may find someone who performs good works done in 
the context of religious faith, and yet this person attaches great importance to its 
connection with intellectual proofs.  Much more needs to be said about what 
characterizes good works done in the context of faith from good works not done in such a 
context.  Malcolm seems to talk as though we are dealing with works that can be 
understood independently of their connection with the particular faith held by the 
religious believer.  Ultimately, Malcolm fails to make clear the internal connection that is 
involved. 
 After his dismissal and critique of the notion of analogies, Winch offers an 
alternative way in which Wittgenstein’s remark that he ‘can not help seeing every 
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problem from a religious point of view’ might be understood.  Looking back to 
Wittgenstein’s surviving letters and reported conversations, we find that when he speaks 
in explicitly religious terms, he usually seems to disclaim authority to give religious 
advice.  He speaks as one who is an outsider to religious faith.  But though speaking as an 
outsider to faith, there is a religious or quasi-religious attitude present.  Among other 
things, we find a deep concern for his friends’ spiritual welfare, the conception of the 
time one has in this life as a gift, and the idea that life imposes certain duties on us.  In a 
conversation with his friend Drury, Wittgenstein once said, “Mind you I don’t believe 
what Kierkegaard believed, but of this I am certain, that we are not here in order to have a 
good time.”97  
 When Wittgenstein speaks about religion, we find that he attempts to sum up the 
sense of religion in a philosophical manner.  We also find that his ‘own voice’ comes out 
when speaking of religion, something not often found in his philosophical writings, such 
as Philosophical Investigations.  For instance, Wittgenstein wrote the following remark 
in 1944: 
 No cry of torment can be greater than the cry of one man. 
 Or again, no torment can be greater than what a single human being may suffer. 
 A man is capable of infinite torment therefore, and so too he can stand in need of infinite help. 
The Christian religion is only for the man who needs infinite help, solely, that is, for the man who 
experiences infinite torment. 
The whole planet can suffer no greater torment than a single soul. 
The Christian faith—as I see it—is a man’s refuge in this ultimate torment. 
Anyone in such a torment who has the gift of opening his heart, rather than contracting it, accepts 
the means of salvation in his heart.98 
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Besides this sense of his ‘own voice,’ however, we also feel a great passion which he 
brings to his discussion of religion.  He brought a similarly intense passion, virtually 
unmatched in the history of philosophy, to his treatment of philosophical problems.  It is 
in this common passionate attitude toward religious and philosophical issues that Winch 
believes we can find the basis of Wittgenstein’s remark that he could not help seeing 
every problem from a religious point of view.    
But this attitude involves more than a mere passion.  It is consituted by a passion 
and a need for clarity.  For Wittgenstein, clarity about these issues can mean everything 
to a person who is concerned about religious or philosophical problems.  “We retain the 
sense that for someone to whom such philosophical issues matter a lack of clarity about 
them can have grave implications for his or her own relation to life.”99  This intense need 
to achieve clarity is perhaps illustrated by a passage from the preface of Philosophical 
Remarks, a manuscript that is an early proto-type of Philosophical Investigations.   
I would like to say, ‘this book is written to the glory of God,’ but nowadays this would be the trick 
of a cheat, i.e. it would not be correctly understood. It means the book was written in good will, 
and so far as it was not but was written from vanity etc., the author would wish to see it 
condemned. He can not make it more free of these impurities than he is himself. 
 
  In the last sentence of this passage we notice the assertion that the character of the writer 
and the character of the work are internally connected.  Just as a religious person must 
strive to live a pure life and see things in the right way, so must the person concerned 
with philosophical issues strive to achieve the proper character and clarity about these 
issues.  
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Wittgenstein’s conception of his life and of the problems with which it confronted him can 
certainly be called religious in the elusive but important sense spoken of earlier.  His philosophical 
work was for him, moreover, one of the most important expressions of his life.  It is to be expected 
therefore that there should be a religious dimension to this work.100 
 
It is in seeing this connection, rather than in some comparison between religious and 
philosophical questions, that Wittgenstein’s remark may be best understood. 
 
III. Nielsen 
 This third section will examine Kai Nielsen’s classic critique of Malcolm, Winch, 
and other ‘Wittgensteinian philosophers of religion,’ as found in his article 
“Wittgensteinian Fideism.”101  Additionally, I look at a more recent critique Nielsen has 
added to his earlier criticisms.  
 Nielsen, in his classic article, coined the term ‘Wittgensteinian Fideism,’ a label 
which has come to be regularly attached to philosophers of religion who write under the 
influence of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy.  Nielsen points out at the beginning of his 
article that there is no one source to which someone can turn for the definitive statement 
of what he calls Wittgensteinian Fideism.  Rather, this position must be pieced together 
from the writings of Malcolm, Winch, Stanley Cavell, G. E. Hughes, and others.   
Nielsen lists eight propositions that together tend to generate Wittgensteinian 
Fideism: 
1. The forms of language are the forms of life. 
 
2. What is given are the forms of life. 
 
3. Ordinary language is all right as it is. 
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4. A philosopher’s task is not to evaluate or criticize language or the forms of life, but to describe 
them where necessary and to the extent necessary to break philosophical perplexity concerning 
their operation. 
 
5. The different modes of discourse which are distinctive forms of life all have a logic of their 
own. 
 
6. Forms of life taken as a whole are not amenable to criticism; each mode of discourse is in order 
as it is, for each has its own criteria and each sets its own norms of intelligibility, reality and 
rationality. 
 
7. These general, dispute-engineering concepts, i.e. intelligibility, reality and rationality, are 
systematically ambiguous; their exact meaning can only be determined in the context of a 
determinate way of life. 
 
8. There is no Archimedean point in terms of which a philosopher (or for that matter anyone else) 
can relevantly criticize whole modes of discourse or, what comes to the same thing, ways of life, 
for each mode of discourse has its own specific criteria of rationality/irrationality, 
intelligibility/unintelligibility, and reality/unreality.102   
 
 The Wittgensteinian Fideist can combine these points to argue that religion is a unique 
and ancient form of life with its own distinctive criteria.  This has the effect of limiting 
who may properly claim to understand religion and also the manner of criticism that can 
be leveled against religion.  “It can only be understood and criticized, and only then in a 
piecemeal way, from within this mode by someone who has a participant’s understanding 
of this mode of discourse.”103  The Wittgensteinian Fideist contends that to argue that 
religious discourse is incoherent and irrational, as Nielsen does, is to enter into confusion.  
“Philosophy cannot relevantly criticize religion; it can only display for us the workings, 
the style of functioning, of religious discourse.”104   
 Nielsen agrees with the Wittgensteinian Fideist that one must have a participant’s 
understanding in order to understand religious discourse.   
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Anthropologists for years have stressed, and rightly, that one cannot gain a deep understanding of 
the distinctive features of a tribe’s culture without a participant’s understanding of the way of life 
of that culture.  Concepts cannot be adequately understood apart from a grasp of their function in 
the stream of life.  If a man has no experience of religion, has never learned God-talk where the 
‘engine isn’t idling,’ he will not have a deep understanding of religion.105 
  
However, Nielsen is quick to point out, this does not entail that one actually be a 
participant, or accept or believe, in the religion in question.  Nielsen does not agree with 
the Wittgensteinian Fideist that religious discourse is in order as it stands, or that 
philosophy is unable to relevantly criticize religion or forms of life.  
 Nielsen turns first to his claim that first-order religious discourse is incoherent and 
irrational, and therefore, not in order as it stands.  By ‘first-order religious discourse,’ he 
means that discourse which is used by everyday religious believers, as distinguished from 
religious discourse which may be used by philosophers or theologians.  The 
Wittgensteinian Fideist will argue that any discourse will appear conceptually confused if 
it is insisted that it must conform to the logic of some other category of discourse in order 
to make sense.  We find this is true if we treat inductive arguments as though they were 
deductive, as well as if we treat moral propositions as though they were empirical 
propositions.  “We have learned to treat these concepts and modes of reasoning as being 
sui generis; inductive reasoning and moral reasoning have, in the sense Ryle uses ‘logic,’ 
a logic of their own.”106  The Wittgensteinian Fideist holds that the philosopher must 
display this logic and avoid distorting or confusing it with some other logic.  “Our job as 
philosophers is to come to understand and display that logic, not to distort it by trying to 
reduce it to the logic of some other preferred type of discourse or to try to interpret it in 
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terms of some ideal language like that found in Principia Mathematica.”107  In 
support of this notion that religious discourse has a logic of its own, the Wittgensteinian 
Fideist may argue that religious language is a “long-established fait accompli, and 
something which does a job which no other segment of language can do.”108  
 Against the idea that religion is a fait accompli, Nielsen reminds us that in all 
times and societies there have been ‘skeptics and scoffers,’ those people, who though 
possessing a participant’s understanding of the religion of their culture, refused to play 
the religious language-game because they found it incoherent.  “There are people who 
can play the language-game, even people who want very much to go on playing the 
language-game of religion, but they morally and intellectually speaking cannot continue 
this activity because their intellects, not their natural sympathies, make assent to Jewish 
or Christian doctrine impossible.”109  In contrast, Nielsen points out that there is not this 
kind of dissent when it comes to mathematics and ‘material object’ language.  “But our 
first-order operations with what some philosophers call ‘material object talk’ and our 
actual operation with arithmetic are not in this state of controversy.  (Meta-mathematics 
may be in a shambles, but not arithmetic or algebra).”110  Nielsen acknowledges that this 
is not a decisive argument against religious discourse being in order as it stands, but he 
does feel it to be a powerful point against the coherence of this order. 
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 In our current culture, Nielsen points out, more and more people are coming to 
find religious discourse incoherent.  It is not enough to point out to these people that this 
language-game is played.  These people know all too well how to play this language-
game, yet their perplexity is over the very discourse this language-game involves.  It is 
not that they are puzzled about what philosophers of religion or theologians are saying, 
but by first-order religious discourse itself. 
 A Wittgensteinian Fideist might reply that it is that part of religious language that 
is ‘really alive in religion’ and essential to religion which is in order.  However, this 
response would lead to undesirable consequences:  “But if this reply is made we are 
likely to end up (1) with a very un-Wittgensteinian essentialist bogeyman, and (2) with 
treating religion or True Religion as little more than ‘morality touched with emotion,’ i.e. 
Santayana’s ‘moral poetry.’”111  The second consequence of this reply is particularly 
troublesome for the following reasons: first, the Christian Creed is crucial to Christianity 
as it is understood by the orthodox, and second, it is a concession that first-order religious 
discourse in not in order as it stands. 
 In many of his writings, Peter Winch has explored what it is to understand 
concepts radically different from our own.  Some of his considerations are central to 
understanding Wittgensteinian Fideism.  In his article, “Understanding a Primitive 
Society,”112 Winch examines the methodology of Evans-Pritchard’s study of the Azande 
conception of magic.  Evans-Pritchard holds that in order to understand Azande concepts, 
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we must understand them in the way they are taken by the Azande themselves, within 
their own social structure, or in other words, in terms of their form of life.  Nevertheless, 
argues Evans-Pritchard, the Azande are obviously operating under an illusion.  “There is 
no magic and there are no witches.  We know that we, with our scientific culture, are 
right about these matters and that the Azande are wrong.  Our scientific account of these 
matters is in accord with objective reality while the Azande magical beliefs are not.”113   
 Winch argues against this view that while there is an independent ‘reality’ to 
which ideas and beliefs must remain ‘checkable,’ Evans-Pritchard is wrong to construe 
science as that which accords with this reality.  “Evans-Pritchard is mistaken in thinking 
that, while the Azande have a different conception of reality from ours, our scientific 
conception agrees with what reality is like while theirs does not.”114  For Winch, science 
does not have the peculiar ability to check on the independently real over and above other 
modes of discourse.  “It is a mistake to think, as Evans-Pritchard and Pareto do, that 
scientific discourse provides us with a ‘paradigm against which to measure the 
intellectual respectability of other modes of discourse.’”115    
 According to Nielsen, Winch makes the real step into Wittgensteinian Fideism 
when, after providing these general critiques of Evans-Pritchard, he follows with the 
claim that what God amounts to ‘can only be seen from the religious tradition in which 
the concept of God is used.’  A religious context is very different from a scientific 
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context, and only within a religious use of language does the conception of God’s reality 
have its place.   
As the concept of what is real or what is unreal vis-à-vis magic is only given within and only 
intelligible within the Azande form of life in which the Azande magical practices are embedded, 
so the concept of God’s reality is only given within and only intelligible within the religious form 
of life in which such a conception of God is embedded.  In both cases there is an ongoing form of 
life that guarantees intelligibility and reality to the concepts in question.116   
 
 For Winch the concepts of ‘reality’ and ‘unreality’ only have their place within a 
form of life.  There is no extra-linguistic or context-independent conception of these 
concepts by which to judge forms of life.   
 Nielsen points to a central passage from Winch’s article, one which underwrites 
the claims made thus far: “Reality is not what gives language sense.  What is real and 
what is unreal shows itself in the sense that language has.  Further, both the distinction 
between the real and the unreal and the concept of agreement with reality themselves 
belong to our language.”117  The claim is that language does not derive its sense from 
‘reality,’ but to the contrary, the sense of the real and unreal are given by a language 
itself.  Winch goes on to argue that these distinctions, though not the words used to make 
them, must be a part of any language.  Without these distinctions, there would be no 
communication, and hence no language.  However, the way this distinction is drawn is a 
matter of the linguistic usage of a particular language. 
 In keeping with this, it is held that one who claims that God-talk is unintelligible 
or incoherent, is first of all making a claim that does not make any sense.  This person is 
using a conception of reality that is not determined by the actual religious usage of 
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‘reality’.  Secondly, this person is mistakenly assuming that their specialized use of 
‘reality’ can be used as a yardstick to appraise any and every form of life.  Yet no reason 
has been provided for adopting this procedure or making this assumption. 
 If we understand scientific discourse, then we can determine within that discourse 
whether a given hypothesis agrees with reality.  The problem arises when Evans-
Pritchard makes the following claim: “Criteria applied in scientific experimentation 
constitute a true link between our idea and an independent reality.”  This is neither a 
scientific hypothesis nor an empirical statement.  Confirmation or disconfirmation of this 
assertion is not possible.  Moreover, “…if ‘true link’ and ‘independent reality’ are 
explained by reference to the scientific universe of discourse, we would beg the question 
of whether scientific experimentation, rather than magic or religion, constitutes a true link 
between our ideas and an independent reality.”118  As Evans-Pritchard does not give these 
expressions a use or show that they have a use, he employs them in a meaningless and 
indeterminate way. 
 Winch’s argument is reinforced by a claim made in his The Idea of a Social 
Science.119  In this work, Winch argues:  
 
 
Logic, as a formal theory of order, must, given that it is an interpreted logic (an interpreted 
calculus), systematically display the forms of order found in the modes of social life.  What can 
and cannot be said, what follows from what, is dictated by the norms of intelligibility embedded in 
the modes of social life.  These finally determine the criteria of logical appraisal.120 
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It follows from this that one cannot apply the criteria of logic to ‘social life as such.’  
Science has one criterion of intelligibility and religion another.  An action is logical or 
illogical within science or within religion.  “It would, for example, be illogical for a 
scientist working in a certain area to refuse to take cognizance of the results of a properly 
conducted experiment; and it would be illogical for a man who believed in God to try to 
pit his strength against God.”121  However, it makes no sense at all to assert that science 
or religion themselves are logical or illogical.   
 Nielsen claims that Winch is rightly understood as claiming the conceptual self-
sufficiency of forms of life.  This seems to further lead to the compartmentalization of 
modes of discourse and forms of life.  “Winch is indeed saying that we cannot criticize 
science or ethics by criteria appropriate to religion, and vice-versa.”122  Each mode of 
discourse must be understood in its own terms, and relevant criticism can only be made 
from within that mode of discourse and not from outside of it.   
 Nielsen asks us to assume, just for a moment, that Winch is correct in his claim 
about the Azande: due to radically different conceptual structures in our languages, it 
does not make sense to say that our concept of reality is correct while the Azande’s is not.  
Even if we assume this claim is true, it does not follow that our religion and science are 
related in the way Azande magic is related to our scientific beliefs.   
There is no ‘religious language’ and ‘scientific language.’….In short, ‘religious discourse’ and 
‘scientific discourse’ are part of the same overall conceptual structure.  Moreover, in that 
conceptual structure there is a large amount of discourse, which is neither religious nor scientific, 
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that is constantly being utilized by both the religious man and the scientist when they make 
religious or scientific claims.  In short, they share a number of key categories.123  
 
We might concede to Winch that the Azande and we possess two very different 
conceptual structures based on different forms of life, but this relationship is entirely 
different from the one that holds between our religion and our science, which share a 
large amount of common discourse.  Within our culture, it may be the case that a 
religious believer sees the language of Christian belief as talking about ‘ultimate reality,’ 
while Nielsen sees this language as ‘illusion-producing.’  “But all the same, there remains 
a sense in which we do understand each other and in which we share a massive 
background of beliefs and assumptions.”124  In light of this fact, it is not apparent that 
there are no common grounds for arguing about which concepts of reality are correct. 
 Nielsen acknowledges that Winch is correct in holding the notion that scientific 
concepts alone can characterize objective reality is an incoherent one.  Evans-Pritchard’s 
claim that ‘Scientific concepts alone make a true link with objective reality’ is neither 
analytic nor empirical.  Moreover, Evans-Pritchard has indeed failed to give a use to ‘true 
link’ or ‘objective reality.’  But nevertheless, contends Nielsen,  
When a plain man looks at a harvest moon and says that it is orange, or says that the sun rises in 
the east and sets in the west, or that his vineyard posts are solid, he is not making scientific 
statements, but he is not making subjective statements either.  His statements can be perfectly 
objective; they can be about how things are, and they can be objectively testable (publicly 
verifiable) without being scientific or without conflicting with science.125 
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In a similar fashion, argues Nielsen, when people assert religious propositions, these 
claims must be open to possible confirmation and disconfirmation.  “Their claims must 
be publicly testable.”126   
However, we find that religious propositions are not in fact publicly testable.  “A 
claim like ‘God created the heavens and the earth,’ when ‘God’ is used non-
anthropomorphically, is not testable.  That is to say, it is a claim that purports to assert a 
fact, yet is devoid of a truth-value.”127  According to Nielsen, while religious believers 
claim that religious propositions are factual assertions, they are unable, even in principle, 
to say how one would establish or disestablish these propositions.  “Or to put this 
verificationist point in a weaker and more adequate way, if we cannot even say what in 
principle would count as evidence against the putative statement that God created the 
world, then ‘God created the world’ is devoid of factual content.”128 
According to Nielsen, Wittgensteinians will respond to this argument by claiming 
that the propositions in question are what Wittgenstein called grammatical remarks.  In 
other words, these propositions “hold in virtue of the linguistic conventions governing the 
crucial terms in question.”  However, ‘key religious utterances’ do purport to be factual 
claims, holds Nielsen.  The problem is that they do not succeed in making what counts as 
a factual statement.  “That is, as Strawson puts it, they are not actually part of that type of 
discourse we call fact-stating type of discourse.  Thus they lack the kind of coherence 
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they must have to make genuinely factual claims.”129  Nielsen acknowledges that this 
verificationist argument may be open to objection, but maintains that it is a ‘far more 
powerful’ argument than the claim that scientific ideas accord with objective reality, 
while it is also remains an unmet challenge to Wittgensteinian Fideism. 
More recently, Nielsen has added additional arguments against both Malcolm and 
Winch.130  The first argument takes aim at Malcolm’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s 
thought in relation to religion.  Religions, claims Malcolm, are forms of life.  “Religions, 
that is Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, etc., are ancient and complex 
forms of life with their distinctive but purely contingent language-games.”131  Of course 
within these forms of life and their associated language-games, we can offer reasons and 
explanations.  However, there is no grounding or justifications for them, that is, there is 
no metaphysical or theological foundation upon which they rest.  If we are to follow the 
later Wittgenstein, we must accept that these religious forms of life and language-games 
exist and that there is no going outside of them.  We can merely describe the practices 
that they entail. 
But, argues Nielsen, “[Religions] are inescapably in part metaphysical 
religiosities.”132  There is an integral and ineliminable element of all religions that is 
metaphysical.  We cannot remove this metaphysical aspect of religions and still be left 
with the same thing.  Nielsen agrees that religion involves committing to a way of living 
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and conducting one’s life, but argues that religion also necessarily involves something 
more than this.  Religions involve doctrines such as the existence of an ultimate spiritual 
being called God or belief that human beings have immortal souls.  
The problem that we now face is this: Religions are language-games and forms of 
life, which Wittgenstein claimed could be neither justified nor criticized, but merely 
described.  Religions are also metaphysical doctrines, which Wittgenstein claimed are 
confusions of language and incoherent ‘houses of cards.’   
If what Wittgenstein, Malcolm, Winch, and the pragmatists say is so, metaphysical belief systems 
are all incoherent…But…Christianity can’t be incoherent, for Christianity, as other religions as 
well, is a language-game—an employment of language embedded in a pattern of human life—and 
thus a form of life. But forms of life and language-games cannot on Wittgenstein’s account be 
incoherent or illusory or even, in any central or crucial way, in error. Such notions have no 
application with respect to forms of life.133   
 
Thus, concludes Nielsen, two central aspects of Wittgenstein’s later thought, as applied to 
religion, are incompatible, leaving Malcolm’s position untenable. 
Taking aim at Winch’s alternative reading of Wittgenstein, Nielsen offers a 
second set of arguments.  Malcolm had taken Wittgenstein’s claim that explanation must 
come to end to imply that explanations end at language-games.  Winch has claimed that 
this is misleading.  All we have to do is look to the work of anthropologists, historians, 
and others to see that social scientists offer us well founded explanations of various 
practices all the time.  The important question to ask is what relevance the explanations 
offered by social scientists have for the kinds of problems that philosophers are 
concerned with.  What ought to be argued from a Wittgensteinian standpoint, contends 
                                               
133
 Ibid., 147-148. 
59  
 
Winch, is that these explanations are uninteresting and useless so far as philosophical 
problems are concerned.   
  In light of Winch’s alternative interpretation of Wittgenstein’s position, Nielsen 
asks,  
If Wittgenstein and Wittgensteinians…are right about the incoherence of metaphysics and 
foundationalist epistemology, then the rationalistic arguments of the philosophy of religion or 
natural theology or atheology cannot get off the ground.  Then isn’t the conclusion we should 
come to about religion such a Wittgensteinian one?134  
 
After all, Wittgenstein had emphasized that being religious was a matter of how one 
acted and oriented his or her life.  Religion is not a matter of speculative reasoning.   
  Before we are too quick to embrace this Wittgensteinian conclusion about the 
nature of religion, warns Nielsen, there are two related arguments against this position.  
First, to understand religion in this way implies that all ‘sensitive, reflective, and caring 
people’ are religious people.  Such an understanding commits the error of turning a 
necessary condition for being a religious person into a sufficient condition for being a 
religious person.  Secondly, this way of understanding religion would imply that 
“…Marx, Engels, Luxembourg, Durkheim, Freud, Dewey, Weber, Gramsci, all become 
religious.  But that is a reductio.”135  This understanding of religion would result in the 
conclusion that people who are outspoken critics of religion are themselves to be 
considered religious.   
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IV. Assessment 
In this fourth and final section of this chapter, I will offer an evaluation and 
critique of the various interpretations and criticisms of Wittgenstein that have been 
considered.  Let me begin by turning to the alternative interpretations offered by Malcolm 
and Winch.  Regarding Wittgenstein’s later philosophy in general, the primary issue of 
dispute between these interpreters seems to be how to locate or understand Wittgenstein’s 
notion that explanation must come to an end.  Malcolm sees language-games and their 
associated forms of life as the point at which Wittgenstein believed explanation comes to 
an end.  Winch does not disagree with this claim, but feels that it needs a bit of 
qualification.  According to Winch, Wittgenstein did not intend to say that no sort of 
explanation of language-games and forms of life are possible, but merely that 
explanations relevant to the concerns of philosophers are not possible. 
To resolve this issue, it may be helpful to look at Wittgenstein’s life as well as a 
passage from his writings.  As Malcolm has pointed out, Wittgenstein was trained as an 
engineer in Germany, designed and built an experimental aircraft engine as a research 
student in aeronautics at Manchester, and spent his entire life interested in machines and 
how they function.136  During WWII Wittgenstein served as a lab assistant in a medical 
facility that was conducting research on human shock.  The medical doctor in charge was 
highly impressed with the relevance of Wittgenstein’s questions and suggestions about 
the direction and methodology of the research.  In the course of this work, Wittgenstein 
went on to develop a technique for determining the seriousness of wounds, as well as to 
                                               
136
 Malcolm, 4. 
61  
 
design and construct an innovative apparatus for recording pulse pressure.137  In light of 
these interests and endeavors, Malcolm concludes, “It would be wrong to think that 
Wittgenstein was in general hostile to explanations.”138 
 The point I would like to make here is that Wittgenstein was involved in scientific 
research and development at a number of periods in his life.  Malcolm is quite aware of 
this and acknowledges it in his essay.  However, it is Winch’s interpretation of 
Wittgenstein’s attitude toward explanation that seems more accurate in light of these 
undertakings.  Wittgenstein did engage in scientific research, both in engineering and in 
the field of medicine.  When Winch claims that Wittgenstein did not object to the idea 
that some sorts of scientific explanations of language-games and forms of life are 
possible, this seems in keeping with Wittgenstein’s own participation in scientific 
projects.  If Wittgenstein’s belief that explanation must come to an end entailed 
skepticism about the possibility of scientific explanation, then he would not have engaged 
in these scientific projects.  Therefore, as Winch has argued, it seems likely that 
Wittgenstein would indeed accept that the hard and soft sciences may offer explanations 
of certain aspects of language-games and forms of life.  The issue, as Winch has pointed 
out, is whether these explanations say anything about kinds of answers philosophers tend 
to seek. 
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I would like to draw attention to a passage from the Tractatus, one which may 
shed some light on Wittgenstein’s attitude toward science.  At 6.371 and 6.372 we find 
the following: 
The whole modern conception of the world is founded on the illusion that the so-called laws of 
nature are the explanations of natural phenomena. 
 
Thus people today stop at the laws of nature, treating them as something inviolable, just as God 
and Fate were treated in past ages. 
And in fact both are right and both are wrong: though the view of the ancients is clearer in so far 
as they have a clear and acknowledged terminus, while the modern system tries to make it look as 
if everything were explained.139 
 
In this passage Wittgenstein points out that the moderns act as though everything is 
explained by science, as though science has made all other forms of explanation 
irrelevant.  We notice that Wittgenstein does not hold science to be unable to offer any 
explanations, but he is opposed to the idea that science explains everything.  Science may 
be capable of offering some perfectly well-founded explanations of certain aspects of 
language-games or forms of life.  However, philosophers typically search for necessary 
explanations. Science is incapable of providing this type of explanation.  It is where this 
type of philosophical explanation is concerned that explanation must come to an end at 
language-games and forms of life.  Language-games provide the criteria of explanation, 
and there is nothing necessary about language-games.  Wittgenstein’s intention was to 
diagnose the sources of philosophical perplexity and to show that these sorts of 
explanation cannot be had. 
 The other primary interpretative issue of the dispute between Malcolm and Winch 
is how to understand Wittgenstein’s remark, “While I am not a religious man, I cannot 
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help seeing every problem from a religious point of view.”  Malcolm interprets the 
remark to imply that there are analogies which hold between a religious point of view and 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy.  Winch resists this understanding of the remark, looking 
instead to a common attitude that Wittgenstein held towards both religion and 
philosophy.  
 I think that Winch is correct to resist Malcolm’s search for analogies.  It is true 
that Wittgenstein neither mentions analogy in his remark, nor specifies philosophical 
problems as the ones he has in mind.  A browse through Wittgenstein’s writings will 
immediately reveal that there are many other problems besides philosophical ones that 
Wittgenstein might be said to have seen from a religious or quasi-religious point of view.  
Therefore, there seems no good reason for confining the application of this remark to 
philosophical problems.   
More important, however, is Winch’s contention that if this remark is interpreted 
as implying that there are analogies between a religious point of view and other sorts of 
problems that Wittgenstein considered, then we are in danger of losing our grip on any 
manageable issue.  There would be no end to the analogies that might be drawn between 
a religious point of view and the various problems that Wittgenstein considered.  Winch 
claims that in order to keep the analogy project a manageable one, Malcolm’s 
interpretations rests on the assumption that Wittgenstein meant philosophical problems in 
his remark.  However, I do not believe that Malcolm’s interpretation fares well even if we 
assume that Wittgenstein meant philosophical problems in his remark.  The following 
considerations will suggest why this is so. 
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Malcolm claimed to have found four analogies between a religious point of view 
and the philosophical problems that Wittgenstein considered.  These analogies include, 1) 
a certain attitude toward explanation, 2) a wonder at the existence of things, 3) a notion of 
sickness or disease, and 4) an emphasis on acting or doing.  However, Phillip R. Shields 
would both add further analogies to this list, as well as contest some of Malcolm’s 
characterizations of these analogies.140  For example, Shields finds an analogy between 
the will of God and logical and grammatical form in Wittgenstein’s philosophy.  
“…From the time of the first surviving notebooks Wittgenstein treated logical, and later 
grammatical, form as though it was analogous to the will of God, and in this way logic 
provided a standard of judgment which was absolute and could serve as a measure of our 
‘sins.’”141  Shields would add this analogy to the list as one that Malcolm has overlooked.   
Further, Shields would accuse Malcolm of mischaracterizing some of the 
analogies.  This applies to Malcolm’s third analogy involving the idea of sickness or sin.  
According to Shields, the analogy in this respect is between sin and certain elements of 
language, as discussed in Wittgenstein’s philosophy.  Following Philosophical 
Investigations 109 where Wittgenstein states, “Philosophy is a battle against the 
bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language,” Shields remarks, “[Wittgenstein] 
repeatedly speaks of being ‘seduced’ by logic, ‘misled’ by grammar, and ‘tempted’ by 
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both appearances and ideals.”142 For Shields the analogy is between original sin as a 
feature of our world and Wittgenstein’s notion that something is amiss and seductive 
about certain aspects of our language.  On Shield’s account Malcolm got it wrong.  
Where Malcolm holds the analogy to be between ‘sin’ or ‘sickness’ and something amiss 
in our intellects that leads us to philosophical confusion, Shields holds the analogy to be 
between sin and elements of our language that lead us to these problems.   
Shields would both add other analogies to the list, as well as dispute other 
characterizations with Malcolm.  Ultimately, Shields finds in Wittgenstein’s philosophy 
“a picture that is broadly Judeo-Christian, usually Augustinian and frequently 
Calvinist.”143  The point here is that the project of searching for analogies between 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy and a religious point of view does not seem to be a successful 
approach.  One could constantly point to new potential analogies, and irresolvable 
disputes will remain about how to properly construe the currently proposed analogies. 
Winch suggests that Wittgenstein’s remark be interpreted as referring to a 
common attitude that Wittgenstein brought to both religious and philosophical issues.  He 
describes this attitude as involving a passion for clarity.  For Wittgenstein clarity about 
religious and philosophical issues is of the utmost importance to a person who is 
concerned with these issues.  I believe that this interpretive tactic presents a much more 
successful approach.   
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Wittgenstein discussed the attitude he thought was necessary to write 
meaningfully about philosophical matters.  In Ray Monk’s celebrated biography, Ludwig 
Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius, Monk discusses this attitude in the following passage:  
…For Wittgenstein, all philosophy, in so far as it is pursued honestly and decently, begins with a 
confession.  He often remarked that the problem of writing good philosophy and of thinking well 
about philosophical problems was one of the will more than the intellect—the will to resist 
temptation to misunderstand, the will to resist superficiality.  What gets in the way of genuine 
understanding is often not one’s lack of intelligence, but the presence of one’s pride.  Thus: ‘The 
edifice of your pride has to be dismantled.  And that is terribly hard work.’  The self-scrutiny 
demanded by such a dismantling of one’s pride is necessary, not only to be a decent person, but 
also to write decent philosophy.  ‘If anyone is unwilling to descend into himself, because this is 
too painful, he will remain superficial in his writing.’144   
 
In this description we see an attitude that is a prerequisite for a genuinely religious life, is 
also an attitude that Wittgenstein felt must be brought to philosophizing.  If a person is to 
write genuine and worthwhile philosophy, then he must do so in a spirit that is 
confessional and humble, and in a manner that involves the relinquishing of pride.  While 
the focus here is on writing philosophy, we also notice that Wittgenstein mentions the 
possibility of one’s writing in general remaining superficial.  Thus, Wittgenstein felt that 
this sort of attitude must be brought to any sort of writing whatsoever if that writing is to 
have any merit.  It is this belief of Wittgenstein, that one must embody a quasi-religious 
type of attitude in order to consider problems in a genuine manner, which prompted him 
to remark that he could not help seeing every problem from a religious point of view.  
The same confessional attitude that is required of a religious person, is an attitude which 
Wittgenstein believed must be brought to all endeavors in life, if those undertakings were 
to have any genuine merit.    
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 Next, I will consider Nielsen’s criticisms of Wittgensteinian philosophers of 
religion, the position he labels ‘Wittgensteinian Fideism.’  Nielsen’s first criticism 
involves the contention that first-order religious discourse is not in order as it stands.  
Nielsen argues for this contention by pointing out that in all societies there have been 
people who know very well how to play the religious language-game of their culture, yet 
refuse to participate in this language-game because they find its discourse to be 
incoherent.  In contrast, he points to ‘material object’ language, a discourse that is 
claimed not to precipitate this sort of controversy.   
 Let me begin by responding to the contention that ‘material object’ discourse does 
not lead to the same sorts of controversies as religious discourse.  There are certainly 
instances in ‘material object’ discourse where controversy does arise.  Consider the 
concept ‘human being.’  A central issue in contemporary moral debate is whether the 
concept ‘human being’ refers to the material object that is a fetus.  This is just one 
example, showing that ‘material object’ discourse may not be as uncontroversial as 
Nielsen assumes. 
 More importantly, however, we need to ask what Nielsen means when he says 
that people have come to find religious discourse ‘incoherent.’  Does he mean that these 
people have come to disbelief?  We do find people who were raised religious and later 
reject these beliefs, as well as people who convert to a religion at one point in their lives 
and later renounce this conversion.  But do these people come to find first-order religious 
discourse ‘incoherent’?  I believe that Nielsen is misconstruing what occurs on these 
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occasions.  The issue involves transitioning from one perspective to another, rather than 
coming to find religious discourse incoherent. 
 In his Lecture on Religious Belief, Wittgenstein speaks of the relationship 
between the believer and unbeliever in the following passage: 
Suppose someone were a believer and said: ‘I believe in a Last Judgment,’ and I said: ‘Well, I’m 
not so sure. Possibly.’  You would say there is an enormous gulf between us.  If he said ‘There is a 
German aeroplane overhead,’ and I said ‘Possibly I’m not so sure,’ you’d say we were fairly 
near.145  
 
When Wittgenstein argues that there is an ‘enormous gulf’ between the believer and 
unbeliever, he is arguing that they are “on an entirely different plane.”  In contrast, two 
people who disagree about whether there is a German airplane overhead are said to be 
fairly near. This is because the people discussing the airplane share a framework of 
reference, while the people who disagree about whether there will be a Last judgment are 
coming from entirely different frames of reference.  The point is that people who were 
formerly religious and then come to disbelief have come to see the world from an entirely 
different perspective.  It is not a matter of these people coming to find religious discourse 
incoherent or confused, as Nielsen suggests.  Thus, Nielsen’s argument for first-order 
religious discourse being in disorder is based on a mischaracterization of what is entailed 
in going from belief to disbelief.  
 In connection with this argument, Nielsen points out that more and more people in 
our own culture are coming to disbelief.  He mentions that people once believed in 
fairies, but that this belief has gone out of existence because people found discourse 
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about fairies incoherent or confused.  Religion, he suggests, is succumbing to the same 
fate because people are seeing it as a similarly incoherent discourse.  Again, I would 
argue, this is a matter of change in perspective or frame of reference, as opposed to 
people finding discourse about fairies incoherent.  Just as a change in perspective caused 
the total demise of belief in fairies, it is always possible that this sort of change could 
bring religious belief to an end.  But what has happened in this case is that people have 
ceased to appeal to a certain perspective.  It is not a matter of coming to see a discourse 
as incoherent.  
 Nielsen’s second argument against Wittgensteinian philosophers of religion 
involves the notion of alternative conceptual schemes.  Even if we concede that we and 
the Azande have such different conceptual schemes that we are unable to judge the 
‘reality’ of Azande magical practices, argues Nielsen, this says nothing about the 
relationship between our science and religion.  We do not have a ‘scientific language’ 
and a ‘religious language.’  Our science and religion take place in a common language 
and share many overlapping concepts.  Thus, the Wittgensteinian philosopher of religion 
is unable to claim that science is an alternative conceptual scheme, one that is unable to 
assess religion according to its criteria.  Nielsen goes on to argue that religious statements 
purport to be factual claims, but do not possess a truth-value.  The problem with religious 
statements is that they are not publicly verifiable, a necessary feature of any factual 
claim. 
 In response to this argument, one can raise the traditional objection to 
verificationism, namely, that the principle of verification (a statement must be publicly 
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testable or verifiable in order to be factual) is neither analytic nor empirical.  However, it 
may be more important to consider Wittgenstein’s comparison of language and games.  
Wittgenstein made this comparison in order to comment on the unity of language.  It 
makes no sense to say that language is a unified whole, just as it makes no sense to say 
that chess, football, etc. are part of one ‘super-game.’  While religion and science may 
have some linguistic concepts in common, this does not show that these two language-
games have a formal unity.  Nielsen speaks as though a common measure of 
meaningfulness must apply to these language-games because they occur within the same 
culture.  However, these are two different practices, each having its own criterion of 
meaningfulness. 
 The more recent arguments offered by Nielsen provide a third and a fourth 
argument against Wittgensteinian philosophers of religion.  The first of these involves 
Nielsen’s contention that religions are necessarily metaphysical religiosities.  A problem 
arises because Wittgensteinian philosophers of religion consider religions to be language-
games or forms of life, things Wittgenstein held to be beyond criticism and which 
philosophy could merely describe.  However, it is also true that religions are 
metaphysical systems, which Wittgenstein held to be incoherent ‘houses of cards.’  Thus, 
two central aspects of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy are incompatible when applied to 
the issue of religion.   
 The problem with this argument is Nielsen’s insistence that religions are 
metaphysical systems.  Let us consider some passages from Wittgenstein’s Lecture on 
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Religious Belief to see why this is so.  In the following passage, Wittgenstein speaks of 
the nature of religious belief. 
Suppose somebody made this guidance for this life: believing in the Last Judgment.  Whenever he 
does anything, this is before his mind.  In a way, how are we to know whether to say he believes 
this will happen or not? 
Asking him is not enough.  He will probably say he has proof.  But he has what you might call an 
unshakeable belief.  It will show, not by reasoning or by appeal to ordinary grounds for belief, but 
rather by regulating for his whole life. 
This is a very much stronger fact—foregoing pleasures, always appealing to this picture.  This in 
one sense must be called the firmest of all beliefs, because the man risks things on account of it 
which he would not do on account of things which are far better established for him.  Although he 
distinguishes between things well-established and not well-established.146 
 
In this passage we find an account of the manner in which religious belief is held and the 
way in which it operates within the believer’s life.  Wittgenstein claims that religious 
belief serves as a picture which the religious believer always has before him and which 
regulates the conduct of his life.  Further, we see that while the religious believer 
normally distinguishes between well-established beliefs and not well-established beliefs 
in the same manner as the non-believer, religious belief is held in a special way by the 
believer.  In one sense we might say that this is the firmest held belief that the religious 
believer has.  The believer is willing to regulate his entire life based upon this belief.  
Wittgenstein calls this type of belief ‘unshakeable.’  On the other hand, it is said that 
other of his beliefs are far better established for the believer.  For example, propositions 
about his immediate empirical experiences are far better established as far as the normal 
sense of well-established beliefs is concerned.  What we learn from Wittgenstein’s 
reflections on the nature of religious belief is that, rather than a metaphysical system, 
religious belief is a sort of picture that regulates the believer’s life.  
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 More could be said about the notion of religious belief functioning as a ‘picture.’  
Let me provide some examples to illustrate.  The ‘picture’ may take the form of a model.  
For example, the life of Jesus may provide a model of how the Christian is to live.  This 
model comes to mind when the Christian is reflecting on how to conduct him or herself.  
Alternatively, this picture could take the form of an image of God pointing at and judging 
or condemning the believer when he does wrong.  The point is that there is no one form 
which this ‘picture’ must take.      
 Nielsen will obviously object that this is to misconstrue what is involved in 
religion---religion is necessarily a metaphysical religiosity.  However, in the passage just 
cited we notice that Wittgenstein responds to this.  Wittgenstein states that religious 
belief is not held because someone says they have metaphysical or some other kind of 
proof.  Religious belief is not held because the believer engaged in some sort of reasoning 
or because they can cite certain grounds for his belief.  This is because this sort of 
reasoning or evidence could not cause one to regulate his or her life in the way that 
religious belief functions.  Religious belief is held by faith. 
 Another passage from the Lecture on Religious Belief may help us to understand 
how faith functions in the context of religious belief.  In this passage Wittgenstein 
addresses the issue of whether religious belief is held on the basis of historical evidence. 
It has been said that Christianity rests on an historic basis. 
It has been said a thousand times by intelligent people that indubitability is not enough in this 
case.  Even if there is as much evidence as for Napoleon.  Because indubitability wouldn’t be 
enough to make me change my whole life.   
In doesn’t rest on an historic basis in the sense that the ordinary belief in historic facts could serve 
as a foundation.   
Here we have a belief in historic facts different from a belief in ordinary historic facts.  Even, they 
are not treated as historical, empirical, propositions. 
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Those people who had faith didn’t apply the doubt which would ordinarily apply to any historical 
propositions.  Especially propositions of a long time past, etc.147 
 
Religious belief is not held on the basis of probability or indubitability.  Evidence for this 
belief would not be sufficient to give it the role it plays in a believer’s life.  While 
religious belief is in some sense based upon a historical basis, the believer does not apply 
the evidential standards that would be applied to a normal historical event.  The normal 
standards of doubt are not applied in this situation.  This is because religious belief is 
held on the basis of faith.  Faith does not involve probability and evidence.  As 
Wittgenstein puts it, faith requires someone to hold a belief through ‘thick and thin,’ even 
in spite of the evidence.  When we look closely at the nature of religious belief, we see 
that Nielsen is mistaken in his insistence that religious belief is a belief in something 
inherently metaphysical.  Instead, religious belief ought to be understood as a kin to a 
picture, one which regulated the life of the believer. 
Nielsen’s fourth and final argument is intended to follow up on this 
Wittgensteinian insight into the nature of religious belief.  Nielsen claims that if religion 
merely involves acting and orienting one’s life in a certain manner, then all ‘sensitive, 
reflecting, and caring people’ are religious.  This commits the fallacy, argues Nielsen, of 
turning a necessary condition for being religious into a sufficient one.  Moreover, this 
way of understanding religion implies that people who were opponents of religion are 
themselves religious. 
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 Both parts of this argument can be dealt with by making an important point.  In 
his earlier article, “Wittgensteinian Fideism,” Nielsen claimed to agree with 
Wittgensteinian philosophers of religion that one must have a participant’s understanding 
of religion in order to understand religious practices.  This, he held, was an important and 
correct insight that anthropologists have argued in favor of for years.  In this final 
argument, however, Nielsen seems to contradict his earlier agreement with 
anthropologists and Wittgensteinian philosophers of religion.  He claims that the 
Wittgensteinian way of understanding religion implies that all ‘sensitive, reflecting, and 
caring people’ are religious, and that persons such as ‘Marx, Engles,….Freud, etc.,’ who 
were staunch opponents of religion, are themselves religious.  But not all sensitive and 
caring people are people who have a participant’s understanding of religion.  We might 
argue that this is the case with Marx, Engles, Freud, etc.  In this case, Nielsen’s argument 
seems to contradict the earlier commitment he had made. 
 But let us suppose that Marx, Engles, Freud, and the others mentioned, were 
familiar enough with the religious discourse of Europe to have a participant’s 
understanding.  On a Wittgensteinian understanding of religion, we would still notice that 
these thinkers did not function with appeal to a religious picture.  The mere fact that they 
were sensitive and caring does not mean that they acted in this manner with appeal to a 
religious picture.  Nielsen is wrong to claim that the Wittgensteinian philosopher of 
religion turns a necessary condition for being religious into a sufficient one.  A primary 
insight of Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion is that religious belief functions as an 
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appeal to a picture, and this condition is certainly not met in the case of Marx, Engles, 
Freud, and the others mentioned. 
 In this chapter we have considered Wittgenstein’s personal attitude toward 
religion and the relation of his thought to this issue.  This relationship does not entail 
analogies between Wittgenstein’s philosophy and a religious point of view, but rather a 
confessional attitude which belongs to religious belief is one that Wittgensteinfelt must 
also be brought to the practice of philosophy.  We have also explored the accusation of 
Wittgensteinian Fideism leveled by Kai Nielsen.  I argued that Nielsen’s critique rests on 
a misunderstanding of Wittgenstein’s remarks on religion as well as a misunderstanding 
of the nature of religion belief itself.  In the next chapter we will more deeply examine 
the application of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy to the issue of religious belief, through 
consideration of a leading Wittgensteinian philosopher of religion.   
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Chapter 3 
 
 
 In this final chapter I will consider in more detail the contribution of 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy to the philosophy of religion.  While the concept ‘language-
game’ plays a central role in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, it is not clear whether 
Wittgenstein would consider religion to be a distinctive language-game, or if he would, 
whether religion ought to be considered as such.  I will begin by considering some 
arguments from D. Z. Phillips, perhaps the leading Wittgensteinian philosopher of 
religion.  Phillips, while cautious, believes there are reasons that religious beliefs ought to 
be considered a distinctive language-game.  Next, I will turn to Mark Addis, a critic of 
Phillips’ treatment of religious belief as a distinct language-game.  Finally, I will look at 
an argument from Gareth Moore challenging the notion that Wittgenstein has made a 
contribution to the philosophy of religion, as opposed to theological or spiritual 
understanding. 
 
I. Phillips 
 D. Z. Phillips148 suggests that criticism of treating religious beliefs as distinctive 
language-games comes primarily from two directions.  From one direction, critics argue 
that treating religious belief as a language-game makes it seem like an isolated, esoteric 
game, which is of little significance outside the internal formalities of the religious 
activity itself.  Treating religious beliefs as distinctive language-games, argue these 
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critics, makes it difficult to explain why people should cherish these beliefs as they do.  
From the other direction comes the suspicion that religious belief is being placed outside 
the reach of any possible criticism.  The appeal to the internality of religious criteria of 
meaningfulness is seen as a justification for something that would otherwise be 
considered nonsense.  Nielsen is of course among this second variety of critic. 
 Turning to the first type of critic, Phillips points out the central concern of these 
philosophers is that the importance of religious belief must be established.  According to 
these critics, this sense of importance will be conveyed by giving people reasons why 
they ought to believe in God.  By offering reasons, it is held, religious belief will be 
shown to be reasonable.  Phillips contends that it is difficult to understand what would be 
involved in such an enterprise. 
 To explain the difficulty, Phillips points to a passage from Wittgenstein’s ‘Lecture 
on Ethics.’  In this passage Wittgenstein distinguishes between absolute judgments of 
value and relative judgments of value.   
Supposing that I could play tennis and one of you saw me playing and said, ‘Well, you play pretty 
badly,’ and suppose I answered, ‘I know I play badly, but I don’t want to play any better,’ all the 
other man could say would be: ‘Ah, then that’s all right.’  But suppose I had told one of you a 
preposterous lie and he came up to me and said, ‘You’re behaving like a beast,’ and then I were to 
say, ‘I know I behave badly, but then I don’t want to behave any better,’ could he then say, ‘Ah, 
then that’s all right,?  Certainly not; he would say, ‘Well, you ought to want to behave better.’  
Here you have an absolute judgment of value whereas the first instance was one of a relative 
judgment.149  
 
This passage shows that there is both an absolute and a relative use of ‘ought.’ The 
relative value judgment holds true only in situations where one desires the consequences 
that follow from the value judgment.  An example of a relative value judgment would be, 
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‘It is important not to catch cold.’  Assuming one does not want the unpleasant 
consequences of catching a cold, this value judgment is true.  However, relative value 
judgments are reversible, so long as one does not desire the consequences that follow 
from them.  Taking the previous example, for instance, ‘It is not important that I do not 
catch a cold, since I don’t care about feeling unpleasant.’  Absolute judgments of value, 
on the other hand, are held absolutely and are not reversible.   
When this first variety of critic contends that religious belief must be shown to be 
important, Phillips asks, following Wittgenstein’s distinction, whether they are using 
‘important’ in an absolute or a relative sense?  It often seems as if these critics are using a 
relative sense of importance.   
We are told to believe in God because he is the most powerful being.  We are told to believe in 
God because only those who believe will flourish in the end.  We are told to believe in God 
because history is in His hand, and that, despite appearances, the final victory is His.  All these 
advocacies are founded on relative judgments of value.150   
 
As noted above, however, relative judgments of value are reversible.  “If the Devil 
happened to be more powerful than God, he would have to be worshipped.  If believers 
are not to flourish in the end, belief becomes pointless.  Belief in God is pointless if 
historical development goes in one direction rather than another.”151  It seems, according 
to these critics, that belief in God is important only if certain consequences follow.   
But this falsifies the absolute character that belief in God has for many believers.  
“[These believers] would say that God’s divinity cannot be justified by external 
considerations.  If we can see nothing in it, there is nothing apart from it which will 
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somehow establish its point.”152  To put this in another way, we might ask: if a person is 
urged to believe in God, and he asks why, what more is there to say?  Phillips holds that 
if a person were told of certain consequences that would result from not believing in God, 
and this person came to believe because of these consequences, then this would not in 
fact be belief in God.  “[This person] would have a policy, not a faith,” argues Phillips.  
There is yet another important challenge faced by this first variety of critic.  These 
critics seem unable to give an account of the distinction between other-worldliness and 
worldliness, a highly important distinction in most religions.  This distinction cannot be 
accounted for when there is an assumption that the value of religious belief can be 
assessed by applying a wider common measure.  Phillips asks us to consider the 
following arguments: 
(1) We should believe in God.  He is the most powerful of all beings.  We are all to be judged by 
him in the end.  He is to determine our fate.  In this argument there is only one concept of 
power: worldly power.  As it happens, God is more powerful than we are, but it is the same 
kind of power. 
(2) Many battles are fought.  At times it looks as if the good is defeated and evil triumphs.  But 
there is no reason to fear: the ultimate victory is God’s.  Here a common measure is applied to 
God and the powers of evil, as if God’s victory is demonstrable, something recognized by 
good and evil alike.  The man who says God is not victorious would be contradicting the man 
who says he is victorious.153   
 
These apologetic moves remind one of the exchanges between Polus and Socrates in 
Plato’s Gorgias.  Polus fails to understand Socrates’ claim that goodness is to a man’s 
advantage.  He points to the Tyrant of Macedonia, a man who is wicked, but has 
flourished.  Here Polus is making the mistake of assuming that Socrates can mean only 
one thing by advantage, namely, what Polus himself means by it.  “For Socrates, 
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however, it is not the world’s view of advantage which is to determine what is good, but 
what is good which is to determine what is to count as advantage.”154   
The apologetic arguments above claim that God is more powerful than the forces 
which oppose God.  On these accounts, it is one and the same concept of power that is 
possessed by both God and these forces.  God and the world share the same kind of 
power, God just happens to have more of it.  “But, like Polus, [these critics] need to 
realize that for many believers it is not the outcome, the course of events, which is to 
determine whether God is victorious, but faith in God which determines what is regarded 
as victory.  If it were not so, there would be no tension between the world’s way of 
regarding matters and religious reactions to them.”155  For religious believers ‘success’ is 
determined by what God holds to be important, and in certain situations this will be 
different from what the world holds to be ‘success.’  Phillips’ intention is not to advocate 
for either side, but merely to show that any account of religious beliefs denying that such 
a tension exists ends up falsifying the nature of the beliefs in question. 
This first variety of critic worries that treating religious belief as a distinctive 
language-game will result in making religion out to be an unimportant esoteric game.  
However, if not careful, the attempt to show that religious belief is important may result 
in distorting the values involved in such beliefs.  The source of these distortions lies in 
seeking an external justification for religious belief. 
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While the first group of critics is generally comprised of philosophers sympathetic 
to religion, the second group of critics is comprised of philosophers both sympathetic and 
unsympathetic to religion.  This second group of critics attempt to show their conclusions 
are reached by criteria of rationality which their opponents do or ought to accept.  
“Unless believers and non-believers can be shown to be using common criteria of 
rationality, it is said, then the misgivings about religious beliefs being esoteric games 
cannot be avoided.”156   
Phillips looks largely to Wittgenstein’s “Lecture on Religious Belief”157 to answer 
this second variety of critic.  He reminds us that Wittgenstein asked whether the believer 
and non-believer contradict each other when one says he believes and the other says he 
does not.  In order to contradict each other, Wittgenstein argues, these two people must 
share a common understanding; they must be playing the same game.  “The man who 
says that the sun is 90 million miles away from the earth contradicts the man who says 
that the sun is only 20 million miles away from the earth…The man who says that 
unicorns exist contradicts the man who says there are no unicorns.”158  In these instances, 
the participants share a common understanding.  “The disputants about the distance of the 
sun from the earth share a common understanding—namely, methods of calculation in 
astronomy…The disputants about the unicorns share a common understanding—namely, 
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methods of verifying the existence of various kinds of animals.”159  The participants in 
these disputes appeal to the same criteria to settle disagreements.  In other words, they are 
‘one in logic.’  We might say they are playing the same game, because they are referring 
to a common set of rules. 
The question is whether the believer and the non-believer, who are disputing the 
existence of God, are similar to these disputants.  Wittgenstein shows that they are not.  
“The main reason for the difference is that God’s reality is not one of a kind; He is not a 
being among beings.  The word ‘God’ is not the name of a thing.”160   The consequence 
of this is that God cannot be assessed by a common measure which applies to things other 
than God.  But what is meant by the claim that ‘God is not the name of a thing’? 
If one says that something exits, it makes sense to think of that thing ceasing to 
exist.  However, we would not say that God might cease to exist.  This is not because 
believers think God will exist forever, but because it makes no sense to speak of God 
ceasing to exist.  We also notice that believers hold it a terrible thing not to believe in the 
existence of God.  The peculiarity here, as Wittgenstein points out, is that ordinarily one 
would never hold it a terrible thing not to believe in the existence of some object.  We 
might also question why there is such a fuss about this belief.  After all, religious 
believers only believe these things to be true.  In normal situations we might say, ‘You 
                                               
159
 Ibid., 61. 
160
 Ibid., 62. 
83  
 
only believe—Oh, well…’  “But, is it not queer to say of worshippers, ‘They only believe 
there is a God’?”161 
Phillips points out that these critics are not unaware of the differences between 
talk of ordinary objects and talk of God.  However, they see these differences as 
indicative of serious blunders that have been committed in the name of religion.  “Once 
the differences are seen as blunders, it is assumed that what are sometimes called ‘the 
logical peculiarities’ of religious discourse are deviations from or distortions of non-
religious ways of speaking with which we are familiar.”162  It follows from this that the 
reality of God is made subject to wider criteria of intelligibility.   As with the hypothesis 
about the distance of the sun from the earth, or the existence of unicorns, beliefs about 
God are thought to have a reality relative to the criteria by which they are assessed.  “In 
the case of religious beliefs, it is said that when they are brought into relation with the 
relevant criteria of assessment they are shown to be mistakes, distortions, illusions, or 
blunders.”163    
Wittgenstein felt that this conclusion arose, at least in part, from a deep 
philosophical prejudice.  “One characteristic of this prejudice is the craving for 
generality, the insistence that what constitutes an intelligible move in one context must 
constitute an intelligible move in all contexts.”164  In terms of the topic we have been 
discussing, this prejudice takes the form of illegitimately elevating one use of the words 
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‘existence’ or ‘belief’ as a paradigm for any use of these words.  In his ‘Lecture on 
Religious Belief,’  Wittgenstein is giving us reasons to note the different use that 
‘existence’ and ‘belief’ have in this context, and to resist the craving for generality. 
 One form this craving takes within philosophical discussions of religion is the 
notion that nothing can be believed unless there is evidence or grounds for that belief.  
There certainly are beliefs relating to religion where grounds and evidence are relevant, 
such as the belief in the authenticity of a holy relic, for example.  But it does not make 
sense to ask for the evidence or grounds of every religious belief.   
Wittgenstein considers belief in the Last Judgment.  We might ask what evidence 
there is for this belief.  Some people are sure it will occur, others think possibly it will 
occur, and yet others believe it will not occur.  The Last Judgment seems to be thought of 
as a future event which will or will not occur.  “We can say, as we did earlier, that the 
disputants are one in logic….Those who feel sure it will occur, those who think it might 
possibly occur, and those who think it will not occur are all, logically, on the same 
level.”165  These people seem to be playing the same game and expressing belief, half-
belief, or unbelief in a hypothesis.   
But must religious belief be taken as a hypothesis?  Certainly not.  Wittgenstein 
points out that the word ‘God’ is among the earliest learnt.  While we learn it by means of 
pictures, stories, catechisms, etc., Wittgenstein warns that this does not have the ‘same 
consequences as with pictures of aunts.’  “I wasn’t shown (that which the picture 
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pictured).”166  Wittgenstein remarks further on this picture of God in the following 
passage: 
Take ‘God created man.’  Pictures of Michelangelo showing the creation of the world.  In general, 
there is nothing which explains the meanings of words as well as a picture, and I take it that 
Michelangelo was as good as anyone can be and did his best, and here is the picture of the Deity 
creating Adam. 
If we ever saw this, we certainly wouldn’t think this the Deity.  The picture has to be used in an 
entirely different way if we are to call the man in that queer blanket ‘God’, and so on.  You could 
imagine that religion was taught by means of these pictures.  ‘Of course we can only express 
ourselves by means of pictures.’  This is rather queer…I could show Moore the pictures of a 
tropical plant.  There is a technique of comparison between picture and plant.  If I showed him the 
picture of Michelangelo and said, ‘Of course, I can’t show you the real thing, only the 
picture’….The absurdity is, I’ve never taught him the technique of using this picture.167    
 
 The primary point of this passage is to show that the difference between the believer and 
non-believer is like the difference between someone who does and someone who does 
not believe in a picture.   
Does believing in a picture amount to believing in a hypothesis?  It does not.  As 
Wittgenstein points out, “The whole weight may be in the picture.”168  Religious belief 
lies in the power of the picture itself.  “A man’s belief in the Last Judgment may show 
itself in the way a man has this before his mind when he takes any decisions of 
importance, in the way it determines his attitude to his aspirations and failures, or to the 
fortunes or misfortunes which befall him.”169  Wittgenstein is stressing the grammar of 
religious belief, what ‘recognition of belief’ amounts to in this context.  It does not 
involve reasoning or weighing evidence to reach a conclusion.  Rather, what is involved 
is seeing how the belief regulates a person’s life.  Wittgenstein describes this as follows:  
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Here believing obviously plays much more this role: suppose we said that a certain picture might 
play the role of constantly admonishing me, or I always think of it.  Here an enormous difference 
would be between those people for whom the picture is constantly in the foreground, and the 
others who just don’t use it at all.170   
 
The issue now becomes whether the people who do not use this picture contradict those 
who do.  Wittgenstein argues in the following passage that they do not contradict each 
other. 
Suppose someone is ill and he says: ‘This is a punishment’, and I say: ‘If I’m ill, I don’t think of 
punishment at all.’ If you say, ‘Do you believe the opposite?’—you can call it believing the 
opposite, but it is entirely different from what we would normally call believing the opposite. 
I think differently, in a different way.  I say different things to myself.  I have different pictures. 
It is this way: if someone said, ‘Wittgenstein, you don’t take illness as a punishment, so what do 
you believe?’—I’d say: ‘I don’t have any thoughts of punishment.’171 
 
We see that believing in the picture means putting one’s trust in it, sacrificing for it, 
letting it regulate one’s life, whereas not believing in the picture means it plays no role in 
one’s thinking.  Those who do not use the picture cannot be compared with someone who 
does not believe in a hypothesis.  It is not that they contradict the picture, but rather, they 
simply do not use it at all. 
 A religious belief, such as belief in the Last Judgment, is not a testable hypothesis 
but is an absolute for a believer in so far as it predominates and determines much of the 
believer’s thinking.  “The absolute beliefs are the criteria, not the object of 
assessment.”172  If these beliefs provide the criteria by which other things in the 
believer’s life are evaluated, then the character of these beliefs is falsified in so far as 
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they are construed as hypotheses.  Wittgenstein remarks, “The point is that if there were 
evidence, this would in fact destroy the whole business.”173   
The difficulty lies in seeing what would be meant by saying that absolute 
religious beliefs are actually mistakes or blunders.  According to Wittgenstein, a blunder 
must occur within a particular system.  “Whether a thing is a blunder or not—it is a 
blunder in a particular system.  Just as something is a blunder in a particular game and 
not in another.”174  For example, when someone has been asked to go on in the same way, 
and continues the series 2, 4, 6, 8, 10… by repeating it, we can see what blunder has been 
committed.  However, Wittgenstein points out, if someone said they were going to add, 
and then wrote on the board ‘2 and 21 is 13,’ “I’d say: ‘There is no blunder.’”175  We 
would not say this person had committed a blunder in adding, but that he or she was not 
adding at all.  By comparison, Wittgenstein imagines someone who had a dream of the 
Last Judgment and then says he knows what it must be like.  If we imagine this to be like 
assessing next week’s weather, it would be strange to think of the dream as slender 
evidence.  Wittgenstein goes on, “If you compare it with anything in science which we 
call evidence, you can’t credit that anyone could soberly argue: ‘Well, I had this 
dream…therefore…Last Judgment.’  You might say, ‘For a blunder, that’s too big.’”176  
In such a situation, we might say this believer was joking or insane.  The question which 
arises is precisely that raised by the second group of critics: “How do we know that 
                                               
173
 Wittgenstein, 56. 
174
 Ibid., 59. 
175
 Ibid., 62. 
176
 Ibid., 61-62. 
88  
 
religious practices are not forms of disguised nonsense which, for some reason or 
another, believers do not recognize as such?”177  
Thus far Phillips has responded to critics who resist characterizing religious belief 
as a distinctive language-game, either because they want to show that religious belief is 
important as one might show a course of action to be prudential, or because they want to 
show the rationality or irrationality of religious belief by assuming the existence of God 
to be established by reference to criteria under which it is one instance among many.  
Both of these attempts, argues Phillips, falsify the absolute character of the belief in 
question. 
However, it may still be argued against Phillips, that his view allows religious 
believers to say whatever they like.  This criticism is strengthened both by the notion that 
language-games have an internal criteria of intelligibility and by the notion that it is 
impossible to render one language-game unintelligible in terms of the criteria of another.  
In response to these critics, it may be pointed out that a religious believer can make a 
mistake within his or her religion.  After all, there are criteria of intelligibility for what 
can and cannot be said within religious practice.  But these critics may press further.  
They may point to the possibility of an internally consistent, but pointless, set of rules.  
“To argue, therefore, that religious beliefs are distinctive language-games with rules 
which their adherents may follow or fail to follow does not, of itself, show that the rules 
have any point.”178   
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Phillips finds this last criticism justified.  It points to a strain in the analogy 
between religious belief and language-games.  One does not show why people should 
cherish religious belief merely by distinguishing religious belief from other modes of 
social life, even though important distinctions are to be made here.  If religious belief is 
thought of as cut off from other modes of social life, then it could not have the 
importance that it has.  The work of Rush Rhees179 has assisted Phillips in coming to 
understand the full implications of this point.  
In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein thought that all propositions must have a general 
propositional form.  Later, in the Investigations, while Wittgenstein had relinquished the 
idea of ‘all propositions,’ he continued to be interested in what belonging to a common 
language meant.  Rhees responds: 
When he says that any language is a family of language-games, and that any of these might be a 
complete language by itself, he does not say whether people who might take part in several such 
games would be speaking the same language in each of them.  In fact, I find it hard to see on this 
view that they would ever be speaking a language.180  
 
One reason for Rhees’ conclusion is that Wittgenstein makes the assumption that the 
same language is being spoken in each of the different language-games.  “But if this is so 
the sameness or unity of that language cannot be explained by describing the way in 
which any particular language-game is played.”181  The problem becomes more acute 
when Wittgenstein claims that each language-game could be a complete language in 
itself.  One reason for Wittgenstein’s argument for the completeness of language-games 
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was to rid us of the notion that there is a general propositional form.  There is no one 
propositional form which underwrites all usages in a language.  In other words, the 
various language-games do not comprise one big game.  However, “Wittgenstein wants 
to say that a language, the same language, is a family of language-games—that is, that 
this is the kind of unity a language has.”182  It is at this point that we encounter a strain in 
the analogy between language and a game.   
At the beginning of the Investigations, Wittgenstein presents a hypothetical 
discussion about a group of builders.  He suggests that an entire language of a tribe might 
be comprised of orders and response, constituted by one man shouting ‘Slab!’ and 
another bringing a slab.  Rhees comments on this hypothetical situation as follows:  
But I feel that there is something wrong here.  The trouble is not to imagine a people with a 
language of such limited vocabulary.  The trouble is to imagine that they spoke the language only 
to give these special orders on this job and otherwise never spoke at all.  I do not think it would be 
speaking a language.183 
 
Wittgenstein imagines the adults of the tribe teaching the children the shouts for a slab.  
But this would not be a part of the order and response of the actual job itself.  Further, 
there must be other situations that take place outside the basic work of the job.  People 
would likely go home and discuss work with their families. Snags will sometimes occur 
in the course of the work, which have to be dealt with.  Rhees argues that Wittgenstein is 
describing something more like a game of building with stones, correct methods of 
reacting to signals, as opposed to people actually building a house.  Rhees’ point is that 
learning a language cannot be identified with learning what is generally done.  “It has 
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more to do with what it makes sense to answer or what it makes sense to ask, or what 
sense one remark may have in connection to another.”184  The meaning of the builder’s 
expressions cannot be entirely with the job.  “We should not be able to grasp the meaning 
of expressions, see the bearing of one expression on another, appreciate why something 
can be said here and not there, unless expressions were connected with contexts other 
than those in which we are using them now.”185  In light of this point, Rhees says that 
when a child comes to differentiate between sensible discourse and a jumble of words, 
this  
is not something you can teach him by any sort of drill, as you might perhaps teach him the names 
of objects.  I think he gets it chiefly from the way in which the members of his family speak to 
him and answer him.  In this way he gets an idea of how remarks are to be connected, and of how 
what people say to one another makes sense.  In any case, it is not like learning the meaning of 
this or that expression.  And although he can go on speaking, this is not like going on with the use 
of any particular expression or set of expressions, although of course it includes that.186  
 
Phillips suggests that what Rhees says of the builders can also be said of religious 
worshippers.  Rhees argues that when we imagine the builders cut off from everything 
apart from the technique of the job, the builders seem merely to be playing a game of 
building with blocks, a system of responses to signs, rather than actually building a 
house.  Similarly, imagining religious worshippers as cut off from everything apart from 
the formalities of worship, makes their activity seem not to be worship, but rather some 
type of esoteric game.   
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Phillips asks, “What is the difference between a rehearsal for an act of worship 
and the actual act of worship?”187  It cannot be a matter of responses to signs, because a 
correct response to signs may be given in a rehearsal.  Rather, the difference lies in the 
point the activity of worship has in the lives of the worshippers.  This entails the bearing 
it has on other features of their lives.  “Religion has something to say about aspects of 
human existence which are quite intelligible without reference to religion: birth, death, 
joy, misery, despair, hope, fortune and misfortune.”188  Moreover, the connection 
between these other aspects of human existence and religion is not contingent.  Many 
religious beliefs could not be what they are without these other aspects.  Phillips points, 
for example, to Jesus’ words, ‘Not as the world giveth give I unto you.’  The force of this 
contrast depends logically on both parts of the contrast.  Thus, the force of religious 
belief is in part dependent on what is outside of religion.   
Phillips has argued that religious reactions to various situations cannot be 
assessed by external criteria of adequacy.  However, religious reactions to such situations 
must also not be fantastic.  Whether these reactions are fantastic or not is decided by 
criteria which is not in dispute.   
For example, some religious believers may try to explain away the reality of suffering, or try to 
say that all suffering has some purpose.  When they speak like this, one may accuse them of not 
taking suffering seriously.  Or if religious believers talk of death as if it were a sleep of long 
duration, one may accuse them of not taking death seriously.  In these examples, what is said 
about suffering and death can be judged in terms of what we already know and believe about these 
matters.189  
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Thus, religious reactions are fantastic when they distort what we already know about 
matters.  If a religious reaction does commit this sort of distortion, no appeal to saying it 
in the name of religion can justify or excuse the distortion. 
 What we have seen is that the meaning and force of religious belief depends in 
part on the relation of these beliefs to other features of human existence.  Without this 
dependence religion could not have the importance it does in the lives of believers.  
Objections to treating religious beliefs as distinctive language-games arise from 
awareness of this importance.  However, there is confusion in these objections.  This 
confusion is the result of drawing false conclusions from important truths.  While these 
critics recognize, rightly, that religious belief is partly dependent on features outside of 
religion, they conclude, wrongly, that one would contradict himself if he claimed both to 
recognize this dependence and to recognize that religious beliefs are distinctive language-
games.  “They are led to this conclusion only because they assume that the relation 
between religious beliefs and the non-religious facts is that between what is justified and 
its justification, or that between a conclusion and its grounds.”190  When it is said that 
religious beliefs are partly dependent upon non-religious facts, this is not to say that 
religious beliefs are justified by or inferred from those facts. 
 
II. Addis 
 Now that we have looked at Phillips’ defense of applying Wittgenstein’s 
conception of a language-game to the issue of religious belief, let us turn to a criticism of 
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this approach advanced by Mark Addis191.  Addis claims there is a difficulty in the 
relationship between Phillips’ treatment of religious belief as a distinct language-game 
and Wittgenstein’s own conception of the distinctiveness of language-games.  “It is 
important to observe that Wittgenstein did not make any remarks about the uses to which 
Phillips put the idea of distinct religious language-games and that therefore this usage 
lacks exegetical support.”192  Addis points out that Phillips emphasizes the limits of the 
analogy between games and language.  This emphasis points to the fact that there are 
different language-games played within the same language.  The question that arises is 
what methods are available for distinguishing a distinct language-game.  “Arguably,” 
holds Addis, “there is no (good) exegetical evidence in Wittgenstein about what 
principles or methods should be used to assist in the identification of distinct religious 
language-games.”193 
 Addis claims that the most promising justification for Phillips’ treatment of 
religious beliefs as distinct language-games is found in the Brown Book, where there are 
analogues to distinct language-games.  However, Phillips points out that while 
Wittgenstein stressed the distinctiveness of language-games, he also spoke of the links 
between them.  According to Phillips, Wittgenstein was aware of the bearings that 
various utterances have upon each other.  But in the Brown Book, Addis claims, 
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Wittgenstein does not treat the relationship between language and games in the way 
Phillips construes it.   
That is to say, concern is not with how utterances made in autonomous and isolated language-
games affect each other….[Rather, Wittgenstein] was interested in how actually existing and 
potential but non-existing language-games might interact.194 
 
Thus, even in the Brown Book, we do not find exegetical support for Phillips’ treatment 
of language-games. 
 Addis also points out that there is not a single uniform way in which the notion of 
a language-game is treated throughout Wittgenstein’s writings.  For example, during the 
middle-period, in which the Brown Book was written, Wittgenstein experimented with 
the idea that language-games were miniature models of language, and the extent to which 
they could provide an account of what language is.  In the later period, in which the 
Philosophical Investigations was written, hypothetical language-games were thought to 
illuminate our language by displaying similarities and differences with it.  “An important 
consequence of these differences is that if Wittgenstein’s changing perspective on 
language-games is to be taken seriously then language-games cannot be treated by just 
one account, as Phillips attempts to do.”195  
 Phillips discusses the notion of the completeness of language-games, claiming 
that Wittgenstein emphasized this in order to remove the assumption that there is a 
general propositional form.  But in his later writings, claims Addis, Wittgenstein thought 
that focusing on the completeness of language-games would obscure the way in which 
they should be used to understand language.  The goal of the philosopher, in these later 
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writings, is held to be the resolution of philosophical problems, not completeness or 
exactness. 
 In considering Addis’s objection, we should remember that language-games are 
not something which Wittgenstein discovered, and that have the peculiar feature of being 
inexplicable.  Rather, the concept of a language-game is intended as a methodological 
tool of analysis, one which helps to resolve philosophical problems.  As Addis indicates 
at the end of his criticism, the issue is not about the completeness or exactness of the 
account of religious belief yielded by the application of language-games to this issue, but 
rather, whether the application of this concept helps to shed light on, and give 
philosophical understanding to, the issue of religious belief. 
 Let us begin by taking up Addis’s contention that the concept of a language-game 
does not have one uniform usage throughout Wittgenstein’s writings.  Hans-Johann 
Glock196 tells us that Wittgenstein used the term language-game from 1932 onward.  
Initially, the point of this concept was to draw attention to the similarities between 
language and games, namely, that language is a rule-guided activity.  The notion of a 
language-game replaced an earlier idea Wittgenstein had for a calculus model of 
language.  According to the calculus model, language was governed by a set of rules 
which constituted a ‘rigid, precise, and definite order hidden behind the motley 
appearance of language.’  “By turning to language-games, Wittgenstein switched 
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attention from the geometry of a symbolism (whether language or calculus) to its place in 
human practice.”197   
 There are four different ways in which Wittgenstein employs the term ‘language-
game.’  The first usage, found in the Blue and Brown Books, involves teaching practices.  
“Language-games are explained as ‘ways of using signs’ which are simpler than those of 
everyday language, ‘primitive forms of language,’ with which ‘a child begins to make 
use of words.’”198  This usage evolves into a conception of language-games as systems of 
communication by which children learn and are taught their native language.  These 
practices are important to Wittgenstein because they show features of our language which 
continue to play a role as standards of correctness.  However, this usage recedes in favor 
of a fictional conception of language-games. 
 The fictional conception of language-games involves the notion of “hypothetical 
or invented linguistic practices of a simple or primitive kind.”199  This usage of 
‘language-game’ refers to hypothetical language-games of a very primitive nature, which 
we invent for purposes of comparison with our actual use of language.  Through this 
process of comparison we will shed light on the features of our actual linguistic usage.  
This fictional conception of language-games dominates the usage of this concept in the 
Brown Book, but has receded by the time the Investigations is written. 
 While Wittgenstein continued to believe that the construction of fictional 
language-games was important for understanding our actual linguistic concepts, in the 
                                               
197
 Ibid., 194. 
198
 Ibid., 194. 
199
 Ibid., 194. 
98  
 
Investigations and other later writings, the usage of ‘language-game’ “focuses more on 
actual linguistic activities, and describes them against the background of our non-
linguistic practices.”200  In the Investigations, for example, we find a list of speech acts, 
including giving orders, asking, swearing, and constructing an object from a description, 
among other things.  In connection with this third usage of ‘language-game,’ 
Wittgenstein also speaks of the language-game with a particular word, such as ‘game’, 
‘thought’, ‘read’, or ‘pain’.  This involves discussing how these concepts are used in the 
context of our non-linguistic practices. 
 The fourth and final usage of this concept involves reference to the overall system 
of our language.  Wittgenstein speaks of ‘the whole language-game’, ‘the human 
language-game’, and ‘our language-game’.  “Indeed, it is through this use of the term that 
he makes his most important point: ‘I shall also call the whole, consisting of language 
and the actions into which it is woven, the ‘language-game.’”201  This is the usage which 
comes to more and more dominate the use of this term in the progression of 
Wittgenstein’s writings.  “Whereas at first words have meaning within a proposition, and 
the game they are used in, he later said that ‘words have meaning only in the stream of 
life.’”202  The idea is that concepts have their meaning within the whole framework of a 
language, its rules, and the non-linguistic behaviors which accompany it. 
 Perhaps we should attempt to identify which usage Phillips has in mind when he 
employs the term language-game.  The first two usages seem to be immediately ruled out.  
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Phillips’ discussion is not about practices used to teach the language of religious belief, 
nor is it about invention of fictional language-games to compare with the actual use of 
religious language.  While there is some discussion of how we use the word ‘God’, we 
would not say that Phillips’ discussion is simply about the language-game with the word 
‘God.’  However, neither is Phillips discussing our whole language.  His focus is on 
religious language.  It seems then that Phillips employment of the term language-game 
falls somewhere between the third and fourth usage.  Phillips is concerned with the way 
in which the whole of religious language is woven into human actions.   
 Therefore, Addis is correct in claiming that Phillips’ use of the term is not 
supported by the conception of language-games found in the Brown Book.  The Brown 
Book entails the first, and primarily the second, usage of the term.  Addis goes on to 
contend that Phillips cannot utilize one account of language-games because of 
Wittgenstein’s changing conception of the term.  However, if Phillips utilizes something 
more akin to Wittgenstein’s mature and dominant notion of this concept, there appears to 
be no problem with this approach.  Again, I would argue, the question is whether 
Phillips’ application of this concept helps to shed light on a philosophical understanding 
of religious belief.  In so far as there are distinct uses of the word ‘belief’ and ‘exist’ 
within the sphere of religious activity, then it may be helpful to describe religious beliefs 
as aspects of distinctive language-games.  The significance of doing so is to show that 
these words are used in a peculiar way within this sphere of discourse, differently from 
how they are used in other realms of discourse.  
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 Addis’s final criticism is that Phillips’ employs the idea of distinct language-
games in manner which Wittgenstein never endorsed.  According to Addis, this is 
because Wittgenstein never developed a methodology for identifying distinct language-
games.  Addis’s seems to feel that we need to have a hard and fast method for identifying 
distinct language-games, and in so far as we do not, Phillips’ contention that religious 
beliefs are distinctive language-games is unacceptable.  Glock remarks, regarding the 
criticism that there is no criteria for identifying distinct language-games, “There is no 
fundamental difficulty here.  Wittgenstein distinguishes linguistic activities at different 
levels of generality.  What counts as the same activity (e.g., whether one needs to 
determine telling a story from telling a joke) depends on the level concerned, and on all 
levels there will be borderline cases.”203  Language-games involve the notion of an 
activity.  When locating a distinct language-game, we need to look for a difference in 
activity, that is, a difference in linguistic usage and the way it is woven into out non-
linguistic behavior.  But actual linguistic practices are not neatly and uniformly 
partitioned, nor is there a single methodology by which we could identify the contours of 
these practices. 
We seem to have come back to the same question, namely, is Phillips’ account of 
religious beliefs as distinctive language-games appropriate for this level or type of 
activity?  Addis’s merely argues that Phillips’ usage is not exegetically supported by 
Wittgenstein’s writings.  However, he offers no comment on whether religious belief 
itself is appropriately treated as a distinctive language-game.  The criticism that there is 
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no exegetical support for Phillips’ argument does not stand up when we consider that he 
is employing Wittgenstein’s concept of a language-game in something like its more 
mature usages.  Beyond this, we must consider the actual activity of religious belief and 
whether it is appropriately treated as a distinct language-game.  Phillips, largely 
following Wittgenstein’s ‘Lecture on Religious Belief,’ shows that there are reasons to 
treat religious belief differently from other spheres of human existence. 
          
III. Moore 
 Gareth Moore204 does not disagree with Phillips’ application of language-games 
to the issue of religious belief.  It is true, he holds, that religious belief is a distinctive 
rule-guided linguistic activity, one in which discourse has its own peculiar manner of 
functioning.  Moore’s criticism of Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion comes from an 
entirely different direction.  Moore points to Phillips’ use of the distinction between 
absolute judgments of value and relative judgments of value in Wittgenstein’s ‘Lecture 
on Ethics.’  Phillips criticizes those critics who want to make religious belief seem 
important by accusing them of thinking only in worldly terms.  These critics argue for the 
importance of religious belief by making belief in God relatively better than not doing so.  
God is more powerful than the world or the Devil, and therefore we should believe in 
God.  However, God just happens to be more powerful.  If things were otherwise, then 
there would be no necessity about belief in God.  Thus, it is only relatively true that we 
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ought to believe in God.  Phillips suggests that people who believe in God for this reason 
‘have a policy, not a faith.’  Moore tends to agree with Phillips on this point, but feels 
that a number of questions are raised:   
There is a great deal in what Phillips says with which I sympathize, but if I am sympathetic to 
Phillips here, is this because I think he expresses a fine philosophical insight, or because my 
religious sensibilities are similar to his?  Is the person against whom Phillips is arguing making a 
philosophical mistake or is he rather expressing a religious viewpoint of which Phillips 
disapproves?205  
 
In answering these questions, Moore asks us to imagine the following 
conversation between person A and person B.   
Suppose A says to B: ‘You really ought to try to behave better,’ that B counters: ‘And what if I 
don’t?’ and that A replies: ‘Because you will be judged by God in the end, and he will determine 
your fate.  If you mend your ways, God will welcome you into heaven, but if you don’t, you will 
burn in hell fire.’206 
 
As we consider what has transpired in this exchange, Moore suggests that it will not 
occur to us that person A is engaging in philosophy.  Rather, this is a religious or 
theological argument about someone’s eternal destiny.  While philosophical mistakes do 
occur in areas other than philosophy itself, the fact that this argument is over someone’s 
eternal destiny should make us hesitate about expressing our disagreement by ascribing a 
philosophical mistake to person A.  It would be more natural to claim that person A is 
making a religious or theological mistake.  Perhaps, suggests Moore, ‘mistake’ is not 
even the correct term in this context.   
We might say rather that we find repugnant the view of God that A is expressing; we might say 
that it gives a truer picture of God to say, not that he threatens B with eternal punishment but that 
he loves him, and that this is why B should change his ways.  A, we might say, does not 
understand God if he can talk about him in that way; but if we do say that, we charge A with 
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theological error, not with a philosophical mistake; it is God that we claim he misunderstands, not 
the concept of God.207   
 
If we follow Phillips in claiming that person A has made a philosophical mistake, 
we would be committed to the claim that person A is not engaged in genuine religious 
discourse.  Person A has a policy, rather than belief in God.  However, this would be an 
odd claim, as person A says just the sort of thing we might expect a religious person to 
say.  The implication would be that person A holds values that are incompatible with true 
religion (or true Christianity).  If it is claimed that person A has a wrong conception of 
God, then the implication would be that person A is not religious in a perfectly obvious 
sense.  Thus, concludes Moore, “Phillips’ argument is not a contribution to a 
philosophical understanding of what religious belief is; it is rather the expression of one 
particular religious belief, or of one particular theological or spiritual viewpoint within 
the Christian tradition, and a rejection of an opposing viewpoint.”208 
The real significance of this discussion, contends Moore, is not to criticize 
Phillips so much as to raise the question about Wittgenstein’s own contribution to the 
philosophy of religion.  “It seems to me that very many of the remarks of Wittgenstein 
which are held to contribute to the philosophy of religion have in reality little to do with 
the philosophy of religion; they are rather expressions of a particular religious sensibility, 
or expressions of a religious point of view.”209  If Wittgenstein makes any contribution to 
philosophy of religion, it is not through clarification of what counts as religious discourse 
as opposed to non-religious discourse, but by expressing a position of what counts as true 
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or deep religion.  However, what is true or deep religion is not established by 
philosophical means, but is a matter of sensibility.   
Wittgenstein accuses those who do not share his sensibilities of being dull or 
stupid, of not understanding religion.  But he does not accuse these people of not being 
religious.  “What I want to suggest here is that for Wittgenstein there is no such thing as a 
religious understanding of life and the universe.  There is rather a range of religious ways 
of understanding.”210  A person may have a deep understanding of faith or a very shallow 
one.  But even the shallow religious believer is nonetheless a religious believer.  Thus, 
Wittgenstein’s remarks about religion are a set of theological or spiritual remarks.  They 
depict a certain sensibility about what is deep or profound in religious belief.  They are 
not philosophical remarks and do not make a contribution to the philosophy of religion. 
In considering Moore’s criticism, it will be important to distinguish between his 
objection to Phillips, and the subsequent conclusion he reaches about Wittgenstein’s own 
remarks on religion.  While Phillips may be advancing a certain spiritual sensibility in his 
use of the distinction between relative judgments of value and absolute judgments of 
value, we should not be so quick to conclude that Wittgenstein’s remarks on religion are 
also therefore depict a certain spiritual sensibility.   
One of Wittgenstein’s fundamental insights about religion is that it functions like 
a picture in the life of a believer.  This picture is one that the believer appeals to in the 
conduct and course of his or her life.  Perhaps one way of addressing Moore’s criticism is 
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to ask whether this notion of religious belief functioning as a picture belies a commitment 
on Wittgenstein’s part to a specific theological or spiritual sensibility. 
Let us consider, in this context, the distinction which William James makes 
between ‘sick-soul’ and healthy-minded’ religion in his The Varieties of Religious 
Experience.211  ‘Sick-soul’ religion is constituted by religious belief that focuses on the 
notion that something is deeply wrong, sinful, or corrupt with the person.  ‘Healthy-
minded’ religion, by contrast, is constituted by a sort of positive-minded spirituality or 
religious emotion.  We might say the believer who functions with a picture of God 
judging and admonishing before his mind—a sort of ‘fire and brimstone’ religion—
practices a ‘sick-soul’ variety of religion.  The believer who acts with the life of Jesus 
before her mind, as a sort of positive role-model, practices a ‘healthy-minded’ variety of 
religion.  Wittgenstein’s insight is that in either case religion functions as a sort of picture 
to which the believer appeals.  This point is independent of the particular spiritual 
sensibility held by the believer in question.  Therefore, I would argue, Wittgenstein is not 
endorsing one or the other spiritual sensibilities just described.  Rather, Wittgenstein’s 
insight that religious belief functions as a picture to which the believer appeals, is indeed 
a contribution to a philosophical understanding of religion. 
Moore’s criticism began by taking aim at Phillips’ contention that someone who 
believes in God for instrumental reasons (i.e. a relative sense of value) has ‘a policy, 
rather than a faith.’  According to Moore, in so far as Phillips criticizes those who have 
an instrumental religious belief, he is endorsing a specific theological or spiritual 
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sensibility.  Even Jesus himself appears to endorse the sort of instrumentalist sense of 
self-preservation which Phillips calls a ‘policy’ in the following passage: 
If your hand causes you to sin, cut it off; it is better for you to enter life maimed than with two 
hands to go to hell, to the unquenchable fire.  And if your foot causes you to sin, cut it off; it is 
better for you to enter life lame than with two feet to be thrown into hell.212 
   
Is Phillips then opposing the very founder of Christianity?  It seems that Phillips is 
endorsing a certain spiritual sensibility in this argument.  He is making a claim about the 
sort of spiritual attitude or sensibility that one must possess in order to have ‘true’ 
religious belief.  However, it would be a mistake to draw from this, as Moore does, the 
conclusion that Wittgenstein’s own remarks on religious belief express a certain spiritual 
sensibility.  Phillips’ argument arose from his own attempt to show that religious beliefs 
ought to be treated as distinctive language-games, and was not something derived from 
Wittgenstein’s remarks on religion.  We find that whereas attention to the actual usages 
of religious discourse do not show us that Phillips’ description is correct, the same cannot 
be said of Wittgenstein’s remarks about the grammar of this discourse.   
So much for the notion that Wittgenstein is expressing a certain spiritual 
sensibility in his remarks on religion, but what of Moore’s contention that he is also 
expressing certain theological assumptions?  After all, a distinction can be made between 
a believer’s spiritual sensibility, and the theological position to which he or she ascribes.  
One might claim that Wittgenstein has a very Kierkegaardian conception of religion, and 
therefore, does indeed endorse a certain theology.  It may be further pointed out that 
many Christians endorse some other theology, such as that of St. Thomas Aquinas, for 
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example.  In this case, Wittgenstein’s remarks are not a contribution to the philosophy of 
religion, but the endorsement of one theology over another.   
Wittgenstein’s intention is not to endorse any theology.  Rather, he looks to the 
actual use of religious discourse, and in keeping with his method of philosophy, gives us 
insight into how this discourse functions in the lives of religious believers.  While 
Aquinas may have developed an intricate metaphysical system to justify Christianity, and 
some believers may be appealed to by this system, we need to look at the role this 
metaphysical system plays in religious belief.  Is the metaphysical system what brought 
them to religious belief, or is it an attempt, after the fact, to intellectually justify or further 
explain their belief?  Wittgenstein, observing the actual practice of religious belief, says,  
…All sound doctrines are of no avail. One must change one’s life. (Or the direction of one’s life).  
That all wisdom is cold; and that one can no more use it to bring one’s life into order than one can 
forge cold iron.  
A sound doctrine does not have to catch hold of one; one can follow it like a doctor’s 
prescription.—But here something must grasp one and turn one around.—(This is how I 
understand it.) Once turned around, one must stay turned around. 
Wisdom is passionless.”213   
 
A doctrine, such as a metaphysical system, does not grab hold of someone in the way that 
religious faith is adhered to by religious believers.  Wittgenstein describes what we find 
when we observe the nature of religious belief in the following remark, “It strikes me that 
a religious belief can only be something like a passionate commitment to a system of 
reference.”214  Here is an account of the role religious belief plays in the life of the 
believer.   
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 But Wittgenstein is not alone in his observation that metaphysical doctrines play, 
at best, a secondary role in believers’ religious faith.  William James had remarked, “I do 
believe that feeling is the deeper source of religion, and that philosophic and theological 
formulas are secondary products, like translation of a text into another tongue.”215  
Metaphysical doctrines are a ‘translation’ of religious belief into an intellectualized 
account of these beliefs; they are not the source of them.  James goes on to explain that 
these metaphysical doctrines could only have arisen after religious belief was already 
assented to.  
When I call theological formulas secondary products, I mean that in a world in which no religious 
feeling had ever existed, I doubt whether any philosophic theology could ever have been framed.  I 
doubt if dispassionate intellectual contemplation of the universe, apart from inner unhappiness and 
need of deliverance on the one hand and mystical emotion on the other, would ever have resulted 
in religious philosophies such as we now possess.216   
 
Like Wittgenstein, James finds that theological or metaphysical doctrines would not be 
enough to grasp the believer in the way that religious faith does.  The difference between 
James and Wittgenstein lies in the fact that whereas the former came to this conclusion 
by observing the psychological experiences of religious believers, the latter arrived at this 
conclusion by focusing attention on the functioning of religious discourse.  
Recall, that for Wittgenstein, philosophy does not interfere in the world, but 
merely describes the usage and functioning of language.  It is descriptive, rather than 
prescriptive.  As Phillips points out, the important issue here is to describe what 
recognition of belief amounts to in the context of religious belief.  This is shown by 
displaying the ‘grammar of religious discourse,’ in other words, the rules which govern 
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the use of religious discourse.  In so far as Wittgenstein describes the grammar or rules 
that govern the use of religious language, he is approaching the subject from a 
philosophic standpoint, as opposed to endorsing any particular theology or spiritual 
sensibility.  Wittgenstein’s own attitude toward religious language-games seems to be a 
naturalistic one.  If Wittgenstein’s philosophical assessment of religious discourse yields 
a picture more Kierkegaardian in nature, this in no way shows that Wittgenstein’s 
insights are theological rather than philosophical.   
But even if this descriptive account shows that theological doctrine plays a 
secondary role in religious belief, a sort of intellectualizing of this belief, it might be 
claimed that it does inform religious belief nonetheless.  What then are we to make of 
theological doctrine on a Wittgensteinian account of religious belief?  This is a very large 
topic and much could be said.  However, I will merely give a brief summary here of the 
sort of approach to theology that Wittgenstein would likely endorse.  While some 
philosophers and theologians have viewed theology as a set of truth-claims about a 
transcendent reality, a Wittgensteinian approach sees theology as a set of descriptive 
claims about the religious experiences of a community of believers.  Theological 
doctrine, on this account, is not making universal or eternal truth-claims, rather it is 
expressing the historically and culturally bound religious practices of a specific religious 
community.  Theological doctrine is also providing the ‘grammar’ or rules for the use of 
religious language.  For example, let us take the theological doctrine that God is omni-
present.  This doctrine is describing a religious experience such as, ‘when everything in 
my life seems to be going wrong, I feel that even then God is with me.’  But not only is 
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this doctrinal statement describing the religious experience of a particular religious 
community, it is also providing a grammatical rule for how the concept of God is to be 
used.  It tells us that when we speak about God, we are to speak of Him as being omni-
present. 
 
In this thesis, I have located the place of religion in the earlier thought of 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus.  The Tractatus conceived of religious truths as being ineffable 
and falling outside of the realm of meaningful language.  Wittgenstein  would go on to 
reject this ‘scientific’ philosophy and to develop a more human-centered view of 
language in his Philosophical Investigations and other later writings.   
Next I examined the competing interpretations of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy 
as applied to religion offered by Norman Malcolm and Peter Winch.  I found that Winch 
had the more plausible interpretation, pointing out that Wittgenstein was not opposed to 
scientific explanation, but merely to the idea that science explains everything.  Further, I 
argued, Winch offers a much more successful approach to interpreting Wittgenstein’s 
religious attitude than Malcolm.  We should not look for analogies that hold between 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy and a religious point of view, but instead recognize that 
Wittgenstein thought a ‘religious’ attitude must be brought to the practice of philosophy.   
I also examined Kai Nielsen’s classic critique of Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion. 
In response to Nielsen, I argued that he is mistaken in his approach to the nature of 
religious belief.  Nielsen attempts to provide a verificationist argument against religion, 
contending that religious propositions claim to be factual, while failing to meet the 
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conditions of verifiability.  However, Nielsen fails to see that the difference between the 
believer and non-believer is a matter of perspective, the use or non-use of a picture, as 
opposed to a differing set of factual assertions.    
Finally, I examined arguments from D. Z. Phillips, which attempt to justify the 
treatment of religious beliefs as distinctive language-games.  Mark Addis criticizes 
Phillips’ treatment of language-games, holding that it lacked exegetical support and that 
there is no method for determining distinctive language-games. Further, argued Addis, 
due to Wittgenstein’s evolving usage of this term, Phillips’ uniform treatment of the 
concept could not be justified.  I argued that there is no need of a method for identifying 
distinctive language-games.  What we are looking for are different activities and a 
difference in usage or rules of grammar.  Phillips, following Wittgenstein, points to 
distinctive usages of religious language, which justify treating religious belief as a 
distinctive language-game.  Gareth Moore offered an alternative criticism of Phillips and 
Wittgenstein, holding that these philosophers offered insight from a certain spiritual 
theological perspective, rather than a contribution to the philosophy of religion.  I 
attempted to show that while Phillips’ argument may be susceptible to this criticism, 
Wittgenstein’s own remarks are not made on behalf of a certain spiritual perspective, but 
instead make a contribution to the general philosophical understanding of religion.     
 
    
 
          
   
